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INTRODUCTION

Should families have more influence on the education of their children?
It is widely believed that parents ought to be permitted to do as much for
their children's education as they can. But since some parents may care
more about education or have more resources to commit to education, their
children may receive substantial advantages. Because other children are
correspondingly disadvantaged, reliance on parental tastes for education may
actually threaten our societal commitment to equal educational opportunity.
At present we deal with this dilemma by having the state provide lengthy,
compulsory free schooling. The public schools are professionally dominated
and concentrate on things best learned outside of the home. The theory
is that at least the negative impact of "inadequate" parents can be overcome. A major drawback of this strategy is that it has only partially worked.
As a result, many policy-makers and educators argue that we must intensify
professional efforts to deliver education to disadvantaged children in order
to free them from the limits of family lethargy and background; some have
argued that this response must come, if necessary, at the expense of children
from more fortunate families.
An alternative solution has been proposed in recent years which suggests
that further professional efforts are not necessarily the right approach to
educational equality. Rather, it has been argued that allowing all parents
to choose what they believe is best for their children will result in substantial advantages for children as a group. Many of those critics who favor
increased family influence have proposed "voucher plans"-which I prefer
*This article is an outgrowth of work at which Professor John E. Coons, Professor William H.
Clune III, and I have been engaged for the past few years. It is a prelude to a larger work on family
choice which Professor Coons and I will publish together. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN,
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970); J. CooNs & S. SUGARMAN, FAMILY CHOICE IN
EDUCATION: A MODEL STATE SYSTEM FOR VOUCHERS (1971); J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, FAMILY
CHOICE SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (1971); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Recreating the Family's Role in Education,

in NEW MODELS FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION 216 (J. Guthrie & E. Wynne eds. 1971); and Coons
& Sugarman, Vouchersfor Public Schools, 15 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 60 (1973).
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to call family choice plans, although generally I shall bow to the more
common nomenclature.' Simply put, a family choice plan is one which puts
into the hands of families the funds which now go to pay for the education
of a child attending public school. With those funds, the family may choose
the kind of education it believes is best for its child. It thus creates a
new form of equal educational opportunity; choice, which is now realistically available to a few, is to be made available to all.
This article is about such family choice plans. It is crucial to understand that reliance on the parents' desire for education for their
child is not inconsistent with a child's right .to have his or her parents
ensure at least some minimum amount. After all, we do not completely
defer to parents on other matters regarding treatment of their children;
abuse, abandonment, and neglect with respect to feeding, clothing or
medical attention, all invoke the state's social welfare and judicial machinery. The real issue, therefore, is how might the responsibility for the
child's education be shared by parents and the state and not whether it
ought to be wholly vested in one or the other.
The policy issues which must be resolved in allocating responsibility
for the education of children are explored in this article. Who would provide schools under voucher plans (including the question of the participation of religious schools)? What rules would govern enrollment under
voucher plans (including concerns about one-race schools)? What varieties
of schooling would be permitted under voucher plans? How should voucher
plans be evaluated? Should plans be limited to certain kinds of families (or
children)? Voucher plans are also compared with other related educational
reforms, and in particular, are considered in the more general context of
school finance reform. Finally, federal efforts to experiment with voucher
plans, such as the demonstration program in the Alum Rock Union School
District in Northern California, are discussed in an Appendix.

I
PARENTAL AND STUDENT CHOICE

A. Choice Today
Although most American children are assigned to their educational experience by local public school authorities, family 'hoice is certainly not unimportant in our present educational system. First, sifice a family can

' See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1962); Areen & Jencks, Education
Vouchers: A Proposalfor Diversity and Choice, 72 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 327 (1971); Arons,
Equity, Option, and Vouchers, 72 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 337 (1971); Jencks, Is the Public School
Obsolete?, PUBLIC INTEREST No. 2, at 18 (1966); Levin, The Failure of the Public Schools and the Free
Market Remedy, 2 URBAN REv. 32 (1968); Ross & Zeckhauser, Education Vouchers, 80 YALE L.J.
451 (1970). See also Berube, The Trouble With Vouchers, 3 COMMUNITY, Nov. 1970, at 1. There have
been many critics of vouchers as well. See, e.g., Ginzberg, The Economics of the Voucher System, 72
TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 373 (1971); La Noue, The Politics of Education, 73 TEACHERS COLLEGE
RECORD 304 (1971); Selden, Vouchers-Solution or Sop?, 72 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 365 (1971).
See afo Solet, Education Vouchers: An Evaluation, The Washington Research Project, Nov.
1971 (on file with the author).
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usually predict a child's public school assignment by where the family lives,
changing its residence can change its children's educational experiences.
Because many families exercise choice in this manner, today's residenceassociated assignment plan is not entirely dissimilar from a voucher plan.
Despite the existence of some family choice and the superficial variety
of public schools from place to place, some observers characterize the
reality of the public school system as choiceless. One group of realists
insists that in important ways all public schools are the same, so moving
from place to place accomplishes nothing. Another group insists that because tracking is so widespread, family choice among schools is
largely frustrated by the assignment of children within schools based on
test scores, IQ, and the like. 2 While there is some truth to both of these
assertions, it seems clear that a middle class family with one child about
to enter school can have a substantial impact upon the kind of educational
experience its child will have by its choice of residence.
On the other hand, moving is usually costly and carries some uncertainties, so it is an inefficient mechanism for promoting choice. For many
families-particularly poor ones-the schools they might want to choose
for their children are located in communities in which there is no housing
available at a price they are willing or able to pay. Since moving requires substantial expenditures, frequent changes of residence are difficult to make. Also, outside changes-a racial balance plan adopted by a
district or imposed on it by a court, the building of a new school or the
closing of an old one-might upset a family's expectations after it has
changed its residence in order to assure a particular school for its children.
Perhaps more importantly, a family will be simultaneously trying to
maximize a variety of objectives by its choice of residence. Who the
neighbors are, where the parents work, how much housing is available for
the dollar, what other public services are provided by the municipality
and so on, are factors to be weighed along with the desirability of the area's
public schools. Further, a family may include more than one child, and each
one may require different educational experiences, a variety that might
be impractical to obtain by changing residences.
Families may also affect the educational experiences of their children
by having them attend private schools. While this right is constitutionally
guaranteed,3 the state may regulate various aspects of private schools to
insure that certain state interests in the education of the young are fulfilled. 4 The United States Supreme Court has never clearly defined either
2 For an excellent description and analysis of the prevasiveness of tracking in American public
education and the recent legal attacks on student classification practices, see Kirp, Schools as
Sorters: The Constitutionaland Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705 (1973).
'Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
4 The Court's dictum in Pierce read: "No question is raised concerning the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils;
to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare." Id. at
534. The meaning of even these general phrases is quite ambiguous. While the Court has reaffirmed
the continuing validity of the Pierce decision in a number of recent opinions, see, e.g., Cleveland
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what those state interests are or what kind of regulation would be permitted in furtherance of those interests. Hence practices vary from state to
state: some states require private school teachers to be certified and others
do not; some permit home instruction by parents as a form of private
schooling while others do not.5 These are important matters to consider,
from policy as well as consitutional perspectives, for they will influence
the scope of family choice under a voucher plan.
Approximately ten per cent of school age children in America now attend private schools, and about eighty-three per cent of those attend
Catholic institutions.6 Tuition at Catholic elementary schools has been and
continues to be rather modest;7 it is often quite substantial in secondary
schools. Although tuition is rising (largely due to increased use of lay
teachers) Catholic elementary education cannot be considered beyond the
pocketbook of most working class families. Rather, for most parentsparticularly non-Catholics-it does not satisfy their taste.
Having eliminated Catholic elementary schools as alternatives, the remaining and miniscule portion of American private education is indeed
quite expensive.8 It is not simply that non-rich families cannot afford private alternatives; in many cases the price effect of having a free public
school option available discourages the payment of private tuition in view
of the marginal benefit perceived. Hence public subsidy makes unattractive
what might otherwise be preferred choice. Of course, for indigent families
the choice of private education is effectively nonexistent.
There is, of course, considerable untapped potential for choice within
a public school district. A few exceptional systems have permitted individual families to choose among a number qf schools within the school district that offer different educational experiences. 9. Internal school choices
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974), it has not readdressed the school regulation
issue since the 1920's.
. 5For descriptions of state regulation of private schools, see K. ALEXANDER & K. JORDAN,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: COMPULSORY ATTENDANCE AND STUDENT ASSIGNMENT

24-30 (1973); Elson, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: The Legal Framework, in PUBLIC CONTROLS
FOR NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS 103 (D. Erickson ed. 1969). California requires that home instruction
be carried out only by certified teachers, while it does not require that private school teachers
be certificated-only that they are capable of teaching. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 12154-55 (West
1969).
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NEED FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 53 (final report 1972).
7 In 1970, "average yearly tuition in U.S. Catholic elementary

schools was only $42." In 1971,
"it had jumped to $120." Gary & Cole, The Politics of Aid-And a Proposalfor Reform, 55 SATURDAY
REv., July 22, 1972, at 31, 32. See also Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 424-25 (S.D. Ohio
1972).
' See, e.g., NEw YoRx STATE COMMISSION ON THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, REPORT ON THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY

AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN NEW YoR STATE 395 (1973), which reports that New York tuition costs range from an average of $391 at Jewish elementary schools to an average of $1,993 at
nonsectarian secondary schools.
1 For example, in Berkeley, California, families are given a choice of a large number of schools
as part of the district's federally funded experimental schools program. See Divoky, Berkeley's
Experimental Schools, 55 SATURDAY REv. (Education), Oct. 1972, at 44. For the past ten years,
families in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, have been able to choose any available public school under the
district's open enrollment plan. Currently, about seven per cent of the district's children (about
10,000) attend schools other than the school in the attendance zone in which they live. Address by
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about curriculum and teachers may also be offered. Yet even where such
choice is formally available, it is often an illusion. While student course
selection is the norm in high schools it may be that counselors, rather
than families, are the real decision-makers. In some cases-particularly at
the elementary school level-choice is rarely offered even as a matter of
form. Since the great potential for variety and choice even within the existing public system has not been sufficiently realized, a voucher plan need
not include private schools in order to present a wide range of options for
family choice. Rather, as Mario D. Fantini has advocated, a voucher scheme
may be directed toward developing "public schools of choice."'10
B. The Case for Greater Choice"'
All voucher plans-whether or not they include private schools-attempt
to place school choice in the hands of families without requiring them to
move or be wholly dependent upon their own wealth to finance that choice.
Hence such plans tend to expand the exercise of opportunities already
available, but practically inaccessible. Voucher proponents have assumed
that large-scale public support for education will continue. The debate about
vouchers, therefore, is a debate about whether it would be more productive,
in the long run, to give families greater choice in the expenditure of already
committed funds.
. Many reasons have been offered to support dividing the present education budget among families. One explanation is that a market-like distribution
of educational services is more efficient than the present monopolistic
system even in distributing what is essentially traditional American education. This assumes that the education students receive would improve
if schools were required to compete for their clientele. Yet, it is unclear
whether the market model would in fact be an improvement over the present system. Considerations of information costs and family choice-making
ability discussed later in this article temper its theoretical advantages.
Other commentators have supported vouchers as a means for some
families to opt out of the broad uniformity of the present public school
system in order to create a variety in schooling experiences not now available. The arguments for diversity are as follows. First, diversity is healthy because it allows new ideas and values to enter the system and therefore protects
society against mistakes which the state might make by acting as a monolith. Second, some children, in order to flourish, may need atypical experiences. If the state is institutionally unable to deal with exceptional
children, perhaps families can better discover and define their needs. Third,
the continuity of home values in school, which is more likely to occur if
families choose their schools, may be better for the long-run development of
the young child than school-home value conflicts, which are more likely to
James Moody, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin, to the Childhood and
Government Project, Apr. 19, 1974.
10See Fantini, Schools of Choice, 1 CITIZEN ACTION IN EDUCATION 3 (Winter, 1974).
"' Professor Coons and I currently are analyzing why family choice might be better for children
to the extent that their interests may conflict with interests of parents, the family, or society.
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occur if the state provides schools. Family choice has also been urged to
promote the mental health of both parents and children, particularly those
in homes and communities which now feel powerless. In this respect voucher
advocates share some ideology with community control proponents, although
they have a different view of the community.
Common to these views about vouchers is a willingness to concede that
some families will make mistakes and thereby disadvantage their children,
together with an assertion, however, that more serious mistakes are made
under present arrangements. There are, of course, counterarguments to those
advanced in favor of vouchers. Because of the varieties of increased family
choice that can be attempted, the various ways in which choice can be conditioned to minimize serious objections, and so on, opposing voucher
schemes in the abstract has little meaning. I believe that those who claim to be
opponents of vouchers in principle should support experimentation as much
as do the proponents. For through experiments we might learn that the state
should intervene in the parenting process, not less, but both earlier and more
decisively.
C. Choice Making and Evaluation of Choice Experiments
Consumer protection experts may doubt the utility of formally increasing family choice in education unless families are assisted in the choicemaking process. In part this is a question of information and its costs, and
many who have proposed voucher experiments stress the importance of
providing information to families under any plan. (1) Providers of schools
would have to prepare a document, similar to the prospectus required of
a company issuing new securities, including information on school style,
curriculum, teachers, school performance records, governance structure,
and so forth. (2) These reports would have substantial uniformity so that
comparisons could be made easily. (3) All families would automatically re12
ceive these school reports.
Even with adequate information, what about the quality of the decision that is made? Voucher proponents necessarily assume that families will in fact make good choices-although their notions of "good"
may vary. Because of the widely varying conceptions of a "good" choice,
evaluation of a voucher experiment will be quite difficult. It is hardly appropriate to ask whether families chose programs that school professionals
would have chosen for the children in question, and it is almost as inappropriate to test whether the children learned the things they would have
learned had they attended school under the old system. Of course, we
might be concerned at least that children learn the basic skills. Perhaps
family satisfaction or the child's happiness with schooling should be the
12 Such efforts may be unnecessary. Consider the system through which families of high school
age students gain access to college catalogues and other information about colleges: bulletins are
available at the high school; they may be obtained easily on request from the college; counseling
is provided by the high school itself; and many colleges send around representatives to explain
their programs. Perhaps voucher schools would make themselves even more accessible to families
than do colleges as they will have a better idea of their market.
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criterion by which a voucher plan is judged.
The problem of evaluation, in large part, stems from our uncertain expectations cf the education system. This is one of the reasons given
in support of family choice in the first place: when the meaning of "good"
is unclear, the system cannot be expected to achieve the "good," and
hence, the decision-making should rest upon the party most likely to make
the right decision or to avoid the wrong one. 13 Still, some characteristics
of schools today are widely criticized. The use of vouchers may prompt
new kinds of school experiences, teaching personnel, and teaching methods.
This is not to say that anything new is always good, but a program which
opens up the educational system to change is probably healthy, even if some
individual changes are unsuccessful. Overall, a choice system will have to
be evaluated by asking how the market for education has worked. 14
There are additional questions concerning the extent to which the state
ought to shape a family's choice. It might want to intervene formally on behalf of high school-age children, for example, by allowing them to veto
selections made by their parents.
It must be expected that some families will not secure their choice,
at least not their first choice. This is bound to happen to some families under
any admission system unless all schools agree to take everyone who
applies. Even then, although the formality of first choice for everyone will
be preserved, if a formerly small school has a sudden increase in applicants, and must accept them all, the increased enrollment may sufficiently
alter the character of the institution so that families are not really receiving
what they chose. Indeed, a reason for allowing schools to set enrollment
limits is to preserve expectations of families.
If a family fails to gain access to its first choice, it may have by then
foregone the opportunity to secure its second choice unless either a centralized admissions process is used or multiple applications are possible.
Even then a family's second choice may be much less desirable, and dissatisfaction would probably increase as the child is forced to a third or fourth
choice. Allowing families to put themselves on a limited number of priority
transfer lists might help alleviate some of this unhappiness. Ideally, the
market would be expected to respond and replicate examples of highdemand programs. Realistically, however, it may be difficult to duplicate
the factors which contribute to a school's reputation.
Finally, some families might not have a first choice because of their
distaste for the other students who wind up at any school they consider.
One answer is that they can forego the voucher and send their children to
'3 Professor Robert H. Mnookin has made a similar argument with respect to involuntarily
removing children from their homes and putting them in foster care. Judges are not very good
at making ad hoc determinations of the "best interests" of the child and should therefore, in general,
leave the child with his family if he can be protected there; in the main, families can be expected
to do as well as the state in raising children. State intervention into the family should rely primarily
on providing services to assist family stability. See Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?,
43 HARV. EDUC. REv. 599 (1973).
14

See RAND CORPORATION, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS PLAN, EVALUATION OF THE OEO ELEMENTARY
EDUCATION VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION: TECHNICAL DISSERTATION (1972).
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private schools which do not participate in the voucher plan. These may
include prestigious private preparatory schools that elect not to come into
the voucher plan because of restrictions that would be placed upon them.
Could the state preempt the field and require that every child attend a
voucher school in order to comply with compulsory attendance laws? Such
an attempt may conflict with the policy favoring pluralism which underlies
the Supreme Court's decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 5 On the
other hand, much of Pierce's objection to required public school attendance is undercut by the creation of a voucher plan, particularly if attendance at religious schools qualifies. As a practical matter, preemption is
not seriously advocated by voucher proponents.
II
SCHOOL PROVIDERS

A. In General
To call plans designed to increase family choice in education "voucher
plans" is to use a metaphor which is both instructive and insufficient. It
is easy to comprehend a ticket to be cashed in for schooling; but what will
the cashing-in places be? Had Milton Friedman, who seems most responsible for our use of the term,' 6 been writing in another year, he might
have called the idea "school stamps" to parallel the food stamp program.
But again, just as food stamps are only valid in certain stores for certain
kinds of items, school stamp redemption implies certain limitations.
Under Friedman's voucher plan, the public sector will withdraw from the
business of providing education (presumably selling off school facilities to
private enterprises) so that families eventually would find themselves with
subsidized choices among private schools.' 7 At the opposite pole, vouchers
might be valid only at publicly owned and operated schools. The proposal
prepared for OEO by the Center for the Study of Public Policy", assumes
a mixed system, but even in the case of a mixed system questions arise.
Is the choice to be among (1) the student's neighborhood public school
and private schools, (2) any public school in the district and private
schools, or (3) any public school in the state and private schools?
This third possibility, designed to permit families to cross school district lines, creates an option rarely discussed in the literature. If families
in Chicago, unhappy about where their children now attend school were
asked where they would want their children to go to high school, many
would probably name New Trier Public High School in suburban Winnetka
rather than any private school. If families were able to act on these desires
15 268 U.S. at 510. See also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), in which, although the
Supreme Court struck down Mississippi's program of textbook aid to the extent that it went to
children attending racially discriminatory schools, it acknowledged the interests of pluralism
which were fostered by permitting such schools to exist.
16 See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1.
7
1 Id. at 97-98.
18 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS (1970).
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and cross district lines, this might mean the end of local school districts,
with power now exercised by the district reallocated between the individ-

ual school and the state.
Although I have no doubt that public schools of choice could be an ex-

citing experiment, a successful public sector choice plan would require
two kinds of responses which are quite uncharacteristic of the existing
public education system. First, there must be mechanisms through which
new kinds of educational experiences will be introduced when there is
demand for them. Second, undesired programs must be discontinued
when there is no longer a consumer demand for them. Because these two
problems might severely limit a public-school-only choice plan, experimentation should include private schools as providers in order to learn about
the type of schooling demanded that the public sector does not easily supply, and whether the private sector is any better than the public sector at
adding and dropping programs and personnel based on consumer requests.
B. Religious Schools
1. Introduction: Committee
v. Nyquist 19

for Public

Education

& Religious

Liberty

In order to determine whether a voucher plan which does not prohibit the use of vouchers at religious schools violates the first amendment's
establishment clause, it is necessary to apply the following three-part test:
the law "must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose.... must have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.... [and]
must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion." 20 The United
States Supreme Court in Nyquist invalidated New York's combination tax credittuition reimbursement plan which provided up to $100 per child for families
whose children attended private schools, including religious schools. Although
labeled otherwise, the New York plan was certainly a kind of voucher
scheme. There are, however, important differences between the New York
plan and the typical voucher plan under discussion here. Whether these differences are of constitutional significance are explored in this section.
Clearly, a voucher plan would pass the "secular legislative purpose"
test, since the plan struck down in Nyquist also passes that test. Indeed,
as the Court has applied the test, apparently no plan would be rejected
unless the funds were specifically directed to be used for religious instructions. General aid to education will probably always be judged as a sufficient secular purpose. Even if legislative leaders publicly announce that
they are introducing a bill to assist parochial schools, that it has been
drafted in a way which attempts to get around the previous Supreme
Court cases prohibiting such aid, and all debate on the bill centers on the
propriety of state assistance to parochial schools, the Court will ignore these
matters, so long as the law on its face expresses concern for pluralism,
19413 U.S. 756 (1973).

20

Id. at 773.
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diversity, family choice (particularly for the poor), and the public fisc
in
(bribing families to stay out of public schools). This may be explained
21 if
two ways. First is the conventional objection to "motive" analysis:
the Court seizes upon these indicia of "motive," then the next time (or
perhaps in the next state) all of the public statements would be circumspect, at least where a clear legislative consensus for such aid exists.
Second, purposes other than the legislature's professed secular purpose
have a way of creeping back into the Court's analysis under the other
two tests; that is, more careful scrutiny of purpose under the first part of
the test becomes superfluous as a result of what the Court chooses to
characterize as effects and entanglements.
Hence, while effects and entanglement will be important to the constitutionality of a voucher plan that includes religious schools, ultimately,
only if its purpose can be seen to differ from the New York plan will it
have a chance at constitutional viability. Thus, the purposes of the two
plans must be more carefully compared.
The New York plan might have honestly served the interests of pluralism,
diversity, and family choice, as well as preserved public funds (or alternatively, have helped public school children whose quality of education
might decline if private school students flooded the public schools and
the state provided no additional funds). Yet the manner in which these
nonreligious purposes were to be served was exclusively through the
maintenance of the attendance patterns of the existing dual school system.
The exclusivity of this objective may be phrased in different ways. First,
families already using private schools would be able to keep their children
enrolled rather than having to withdraw them for financial reasons and
put them. in public schools. Alternatively, economic objectives can be put
forth in support of the New York plan which assume that it would have no
influence on present school choice patterns: (1) giving these funds to
families allows them to pass them on to religious schools in the form of
higher tuition rates; (2) the funds will not be passed on but are provided
so as to equitably treat parents who pay taxes for public schools they do
not use because they use existing private schools instead.
In theory, one would expect there to be families at the margin for whom
even this small subsidy would be sufficient to stimulate changes in
school choice, but there was no pretense that the program was targeted at
such families. Indeed, not only did no one seriously argue that by providing $50 or $100 per child families would begin to leave public schools
in order to attend private ones, but this response is also contrary to the professed
"secular purpose" language of the law itself. Children presently attending
public schools were not to leave, but rather were to be spared the impact of
large-scale transfers which would result if private schools were forced to
close.2 2 Hence, it was well understood that the characteristics of the
present private school system were meant to be preserved. Finally, and
21 See,
22

e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971).
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 765.
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this is the key point, it was clear to everyone that the present private
school system was comprised almost entirely of religious schools.
By contrast, the voucher plans under discussion here are supported in
substantial respect by those who advocate diversity in education in general, and who do not base their case on the importance of education
provided by religious organizations. *More importantly, the voucher proposal is put forward with the explicit intent of changing the present
schooling structure. It is designed both to allow and to induce families
to change the educational experience now provided to their children.
Indeed, it is self-consciously directed more toward those who currently
attend public schools than toward those now enrolled in private schools.
Thus the "secular purposes" of the two plans, the New York and the voucher
plans, are not the same. To be sure, a voucher plan need not include
those who in fact receive their schooling from religious organizations.
Yet the inclusion of religious schools as valid places to cash the voucher
is fully consistent with the overall objective of allowing families to decide
where the child is to be educated, so long as he is educated.
In order to have a context in which to evaluate the "primary effect" and
"entanglement" tests, one should consider this scenario:
At present in the voucher area the public schools enroll ninety per cent of the
students; eight per cent are enrolled in Catholic schools, one per cent in secular
private schools. After the voucher plan is put into effect, the public schools
enroll seventy per cent of the students, fifty per cent attending their neighborhood school and twenty per cent attending other public schools of choice. The
remaining thirty per cent attend private schools; fifteen l5er cent are now enrolled in religious schools, twelve per cent Catholic and three per cent other.
Of the eight per cent formerly enrolled in Catholic schools, some have actually
switched schools although some of them now attend other Catholic schools.
Under the voucher plan rules (1) children present their vouchers to their
schools and the schools redeem them at a state agency; and (2) there are a variety
of regulations imposed on participating schools which relate to enrollment,
tuition charges, curriculum, and other matters of the sort addressed elsewhere
in this article. In short, as a result of the introduction of the family choice plan,
it appears that more than one-third of the students attend schools other than
those which they would have attended had the plan not been put into effect.
2. The "PrimaryEffect" Test
In Nyquist, New York's tuition reimbursement and tax credit provisions were held to fail the "primary effect" test. If the "primary effect"
of the voucher plan described in my scenario is to be distinguished from
that in Nyquist, it must grow out of a conclusion that the beneficiaries
of the plan only incidentally include clients of religious schools and hence
religion is only incidentally aided. It may be argued that the "primary
effect" of the voucher plan is educational change or innovation in education,
or that the "primary effect" is to enable families with a variety of tastes
in education to satisfy those tastes. But these phrasings seem to be merely
other labels which come down to the same initial proposition: unlike the
situation in Nyquist, those who patronize the religious schools are not
the main beneficiaries. Does this matter?
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Chief Justice Burger in his opinion in Nyquist argued both that tallying
up the beneficiaries should not count in the application of the "primary
effect" test and that the majority opinion could only be distinguished from the
earlier Walz decision 22a on such a basis. Hence, he dissented.
The majority in Nyquist was deliberately, but unsuccessfully, ambiguous
on the issue of beneficiaries. Mr. Justice Powell's opinion pointedly and
repeatedly observed that a high proportion of those who would benefit
from the tuition reimbursement and tax credit rules would be users of religious schools. 23 In a companion case, Sloan v. Lemon,2 4 in which the

Court
jority
of its
jority

struck down Pennsylvania's tuition reimbursement plan, the maopinion states outright that "[t]he State has singled out a class
citizens for a special economic benefit.12 5 At the same time, the main Nyquist was careful to say that, although who the benefi-

ciaries were "might have controlling significance, '

26

it was not voiding

the plans solely for that reason. Rather, it argued, the tuition reimbursement
plans were deficient on the two-step reasoning that (1) tuition reimbursement
of families using private schools is no different from direct payment of the
tuition to the schools themselves, and (2) there is no assurance that the tuition
would be used for solely secular purposes as had been true in the earlier textbook, 2 7 transportation, 28 and construction assistance 29 cases. The tax credit pro-

vision was then, in turn, held to be indistinguishable in its effect from the
tuition reimbursement provisions and hence also unconstitutional.
The "assurance of secular use" requirement had been invoked earlier
in the Nyquist opinion to strike down that part of the New York program which provided funds to nonpublic schools for "maintenance and re30
pair." In Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty,
New York's plan for reimbursing nonpublic schools for expenses incurred
inproviding testing and related services was also voided because it failed
to assure that the funds provided would be used for purely secular purposes.3 1 The defendants in Nyquist had argued that both the maintenance and repair moneys and the tuition reimbursement and tax credit
funds were small enough in amount in comparison with what the schools
spent so as to provide a statistical guarantee that the funds would serve
secular purposes. The legislature clearly had opted for this statistical guarantee
approach after the Supreme Court, in an earlier case, 32 had struck down,
22a Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Walz the Court upheld New York's exemption
of religious property from the property tax; the exemption was part of a scheme which exempted
charitable, educational, and religious property. The majority reaffirmed its decision in Walz
during the course of the Nyquist opinion; its efforts to distinguish Walz are discussed at p. 529 infra.
23 413 U.S. at 768, 774, 783 & 794.
24 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
2
1Id. at 832. That the beneficiaries of the Pennsylvania plan were seen almost entirely to be
users of religious schools is made clear by the Court, id. at 830.
2 413 U.S. at 794.
2'7Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
28 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
29
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
30 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
31
Id. at 4 82.
12 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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as violating the "entanglement" test, administrative rules 'which were
designed to insure that money would not be used for religious purposes.
Thus the New York plan challenged in Nyquist seems to be one more
effort to induce the Court to accept a theory that aid does not violate the
establishment clause "so long as such aid does not exceed the value of the
secular educational service rendered by the school." 33 The Court in
Nyquist, however, rejected the statistical guarantee argument and hence
the secular value-for-money theory, restricting aid to items which, if they are
to be analysed in this fashion, are either inherently secular, such as bus rides or
books, or can be assured of having a secular use without offensive entanglement,
as in the case of buildings. It is clear that tax credits, tuition reimbursement,
and vouchers fall outside the "inherently secular" category.
I have difficulty accepting the secular use requirement, however, as it was
applied in Nyquist, independent of a prior conclusion about the plan's beneficiaries. The bus ride and textbook cases may be distinguished from the tuition reimbursement and tax credit cases on one of two bases: either (1) when
the beneficiaries are essentially limited to religious schools and their users,
then the strict test as to secular use applies-thereby upholding the bus rides
and textbook programs but invalidating the tuition reimbursement and tax credit (and maintenance and repair and testing services) programs; or (2) since in
the bus ride and textbook cases the beneficiaries of the programs are properly
seen as all students, and not just users of religious schools, the inherently secular nature of the aid is superfluous to distinguish these programs from the
others. 34 Either explanation may provide support for the above voucher
plan scenario.3 5
It might be argued in response that both requirements-secular use and
unrestricted beneficiaries-must be satisfied; this notion finds support in
the construction financing cases where the Court emphasized that the
governmental aid program which was upheld not only was made available to
both public and private institutions, but also there were assurances contained in the programs that the funds would not go to support the construction of buildings which would be used for religious purposes.3 6 Indeed,
in Tilton v. Richardson the Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the
Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, which after twenty years would
have turned federally financed buildings over to religious schools, on the
ground that the buildings might then be used for religious purposes. 37
Yet notwithstanding these construction cases, it simply is not true that
state aid which results in the assistance of religious institutions must have an
inherently secular nature in order to withstand attack under the "primary
effect" test. Clearly, welfare recipients may donate to religious organizations
the money they receive from the state, and the Court has given no indication

"4 Choper, The EstablishmentClause andAid to ParochialSchools, 56 CALiF.L. REv. 260, 266 (1968).

The Court now seems to see the textbook and bus ride cases as ones in which all children
were the beneficiaries. See 413 U.S. at 781-82.
3
sSee note 28 supra and accompanying text.
a Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 736-37 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679-80

(1971).
37

403 U.S. at 683-84.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

that it looks unfavorably on federal or state income tax "charitable" deductions
for gifts to religious organizations. And, of course, there is the precedent of
Walz. Proponents of voucher plans which include religious schools obviously
will continue to point to these, examples even after Nyquist.
One might be tempted to argue that, since the aid in the bus ride and
textbook examples goes first to families, the support of religion is indirect
rather than direct, which is clearly how the New York legislature had hoped
the Court might view its tuition reimbursement/tax credit plan. Vouchers,
too, are given to families. But surely the Court is right in concluding that
a statute is not immune from constitutional attack simply because the
family, rather than the religious school, deals with the state. One must be
careful not to embrace a "child benefit" (or even "citizen benefit") theory
which puts form over substance. On the other hand, the line must be
drawn somewhere. Chief Justice Burger gives an example in his dissent of the
state agreeing to pay a person $10 if he attends religious services weekly-this,
all would agree, would violate the establishment clause. 37 a Another example
is a tuition reimbursement plan which is formally restricted to the users of
religious schools. Observe that the line of unconstitutionality, when the benefit
is given to the family, might have been drawn, as Chief Justice Burger seems
to prefer, at the place where payments are made based on acts which, on the
face of the statute, are limited to matters relating to religion. That is, so long
as the eligible class is not restricted to religious school users, the aid to religion
which results is merely incidental.
But the majority did not draw the line there. Observe further that it might
also have drawn the line at cases in which the beneficiary is given unrestricted
cash, so as to protect the freedom of the welfare recipient. In turn, tax deductions for charitable contributions to religious groups would seem to be justified only if they yielded at least their value in secular services from the donee
religious group. But, as the Court seems disinclined to accept the secular valuefor-money theory, for it to draw the line at cash would seemingly be to disavow
both the hypothetical charitable deduction case and Walz, and this it plainly
did not do.
Rather, because the beneficiaries of the New York plan were in very large
respect the same persons who would have been beneficiaries had the statute on its face been restricted to religious school users, the program was
seen by the Court as having the same primary effect as would a religiously
restricted program. This necessarily puts the Court in the position of making
the "primary effect" test a matter of numbers. In short, it drew the line
not at who might be in the class of beneficiaries, but who was in the class.
This analysis perhaps leaves the construction assistance cases hanging
as examples of judicial overkill, although they were not indirect aid cases.
Moreover, it may not be stretching things too much to insist that there is
something more offensive to the establishment clause about having a building about which it may be said "this chapel was built (and paid for) under
a contract with (under a grant from) the state," than it is to be able to say
37a

413 U.S. at 801.
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that "the operation of this religious school is made possible through the
tax deductibility of gifts to us, or, for that
matter, from scholarships pro38
vided by the government to our students.
Perhaps we are left, after Nyquist, with a sliding scale which depends upon both the nature and specificity of the program itself and the
identity of the beneficiaries. Hence, if the government builds structures
for voluntary membership associations, it may not build halls of worship
for church groups simply because it builds most of its buildings for nonchurch groups. This is so because the item which the government provides
itself is religious. On the other hand, the state would be able to build a
hospital for a church group as part of a general program of building
hospitals, even though this means that the church could now afford to
build a chapel, and even though undeniably religious activities occur in the
hospital along with health care. Since hospitals do in the main serve secular functions, and since the program in fact includes a substantial number
of beneficiaries which are not religion-associated, further judicial scrutiny into
whether the state is in fact getting full secular value for money may not be
needed to protect the concerns underlying the establishment clause.
The purpose of the "primary effect" test is to help the Court discover
whether the statute operates in a manner which is "neutral" toward religion. Neutrality is that delicately balanced safe ground between the impermissible assistance condemned by the establishment clause and the
equally impermissible governmental hostility condemned by the free exercise clause. From this perspective, it is appropriate that the Court inquire
whether the primary beneficiaries are religious institutions and their users,
and if not, whether, in the main, the nature of the aid is secular. At least
by concerning itself with either (1) whether the point of the program is
distinctly religious at the beneficiary level or (2) whether the aid is religious
in its very nature, it will protect taxpayers generally against plans which
single out religion for benefit, at the same time not disadvantaging those
who prefer to obtain secular services packaged together with religion.
Whether such an inequity is judicially administrable is yet another matter.
If, after Nyquist, the "primary effect" test is to be applied, in part,
by looking to the beneficiaries of a statute, it is crucial to decide what is
the relevant statute. An important point to note here is that by having free
public schools in the first place, the state already is non-neutral in certain
respects. Not only do all families have to pay taxes for public schools,
thereby reducing the funds they have available for private religious schools,
but also the price effect of free public schools serves as a disincentive to
attend private religious schools. Hence, in Nyquist the Court might have
chosen to evaluate the entire state scheme for the financing of public and
private schools. From this viewpoint the "primary effect" of that scheme
might have been seen to be some kind of rough equity between users of
38 Or perhaps in Tilton the Court was carried away by Congress' own endeavor to separate out
funding of religious buildings.
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the different kinds of schools. 39 In fact, the Court chose to look only at
the specific new statute relating to users of private schools. By contrast,
in Walz, which was concerned with the tax exempt status accorded property used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes,
the Court pointed to the entire provision relating to property tax exemptions, not just to the part relating to religious organizations. 40 Surely, this
ought not to be a matter of the drafting style of the legislature-that is,
whether there is a discrete statute. Viewing the voucher plan scenario under
this approach to the "primary effect" test, the argument would be that, while
the plan does assist religious schools since the beneficiaries are only in part
religious school users, and since schooling is in the main secular, the assistance
to religious schools, as in Walz, is only incidental.
In the scenario, more than forty per cent of the school population attends newly chosen schools. Of the fifty per cent attending other than
neighborhood public schools, thirty-five per cent attend nonreligious schools.
Where private schools are selected, half the students attend schools which
are nonreligious. An approach which counts beneficiaries, however, immediately exposes additional issues. Who- would be counted in deciding
whether the beneficiaries are primarily religious school users and how many
would make a plan "primarily" religious in nature? I suggest that the Court is
likely to count all those who in fact select other than neighborhood public
schools but not all families in the system, even though all are entitled to
choose something else. The majority in Nyquist looks to the marginal
change brought about by the passage of the New York law and argues
that the tuition reimbursement/tax credit plan does not give "comparable
benefits to all parents of schoolchildren whether enrolled in public or nonpublic schools.... The grants to parents of private schoolchildren are
given in addition to the right that they have to send their children to public
schools 'totally at state expense.' "41 Further, only if very few-perhaps
less than twenty-five per cent-made nonreligious choices, is the plan
likely to be said to be one which primarily aids religious schools? That is, a
"majority" test should not apply. What would be crucial to the Court, under
my interpretation, is what the political perceptions of the plan are. In other
words, Nyquist seems to have blurred the "primary effect" test with what now
appears to be one portion of the "entanglement" test-political entanglement
of church and state.
39

This idea is urged in their dissents by both Chief Justice Burger, 413 U.S. at 803, and Justice
Rehnquist, id. at 812.
40 The Court, noting that a conflict arises when the free exercise clause and the establishment
clause of the first amendment are extended to their logical limits, declared that the constitutional
course is one of "benevolent neutrality." Furthermore, a tax exemption is not a sponsorship
since the government does not transfer revenue to churches, "but simply abstains from demanding
that the church support the state." The Court indicated that involvement of state with church
is far greater when a tax is levied than not, and an exemption tends to reinforce the desired
separation of church and state. The Court noted that tax exemptions accorded libraries, art
galleries, or hospitals do not make them an arm of the state, and police and fire protection must
inevitably be furnished to houses of worship as to all persons and institutions within the state
including other tax exempt organizations. The New York tax exemption did not therefore violate
the Constitution. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 675 & 676 (1970).
41 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
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3. The "Entanglement" Test
While not basing its holding on "entanglement," the Court in Nyquist
discussed the test and intimated that the New York plan failed on this
point as well. 42 The concern over political entanglement seems to be that
the New York tuition reimbursementtax credit law was widely seen as a
church-state issue, and that if the law were upheld, there would be further
demands for funds for religious schools, which both had and would continue to produce political strife with respect to religion-both among religious groups and between those who favor and those who oppose state
43
assistance (even indirectly) to religion.
Comparing the voucher plan scenario in political entanglement terms
with the New York plan, arguably substantial differences exist; (1) the
voucher plan was presented as an issue of family choice in education and
not as parochial school aid; (2) it was adopted by the legislature as an experiment in increasing the family role in schooling; and (3) as more than
one-third of the children attend non-neighborhood schools which are not
religious schools, the plan is not likely to cause religious strife. It is in
this sense that the Court's attempt to distinguish Walz in the Nyquist
opinion may be important. While acknowledging that the long history
of exempting religious organizations from the property tax was insufficient
to bar present-day constitutional inquiry, the Court plainly felt the long
tradition was important. As religious groups generally are seen to do
charitable work it would not be surprising that their inclusion in the list
was, neither at the outset nor through the years, a political issue. A proposal to abolish federal income tax deductions for gifts to all charitable
groups except religious organizations, however, might not fare so well.
Even if the voucher plan survives the political aspect of the entanglement test, it might run into problems under the. other portion of the testthe administrative aspect. This was not an issue in Nyquist, as the plan
did not appear to increase state administrative in-olvement with nonpublic schools. 44 The concern of the Court under this branch of the entanglement test is whether the state will be interfering too much with the
operation of religious organizations. Here Walz stands out in sharp contrast to Lemon v. Kurtzman. 45 The Walz Court concluded that a property
tax exemption actually fosters a decrease in administrative entanglements
since the state would not be involved in appraising church property, in
selling church property at foreclosure if it became necessary, and so forth.
On the other hand, in Lemon, where the state sought to purchase secular
services from religious schools, the statute failed the administrative en46
tanglement test.
42

Id. at 794-98.

43Id. at 796-97.
44There might have been some state review of the bona fides of school tuition receipts which

formed the basis for the reimbursement and tax credit benefits.
45403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4"The Court was also concerned about political entanglement, intimating that Pennsylvania's
and Rhode Island's purchase of services plans failed both parts of the test.
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Most voucher plans contain controls on participating schools which
would require administrative supervision. Also, it is contemplated that the
school, not the family, will cash the voucher, thus creating additional administrative involvement. However, the important concern about administrative entanglement should be whether the state interferes with distinctively religious matters. For example in Lemon the Court was concerned that public administrators would go into the private schools to
determine whether teachers, whose salaries were partially paid for by the
state, were teaching religion in their classes or allowing religious ideas to
permeate the curriculum. In other words, since the administrative entanglement in Lemon was to be for the purpose of assuring secular use of the
state money, close surveillance of the religious activities of the school was
implied. This constituted a risk of excess governmental direction of churches.
The administrative entanglement that arises under a voucher plan
arguably is for different purposes. No attempt to discover the extent to
which religion is taught at the school is involved; rather, supervision will
be for the same general child protection purposes that the state pursues
today in its regulation of private schools. Even the state's tie to the school
through the voucher cash-in procedure is an administrative convenience
which is designed to assure that the family uses the state money for education and does not intrude into the school's religious affairs.
4. Alternative Outcomes

Having now argued the case for the voucher plan under the "primary
effect" and "entanglement" tests, it should be noted that some serious
concerns do cut the other way, particularly if the reality differs from the
proposed scenario. There are three possibilities that may well jeopardize
the plan's acceptability under the "primary effect" and "political entanglement" tests: (1) only a few families change from the schools that they are
attending prior to the institution of the voucher plan and most of those
who change elect religious schools; (2) religious groups provide a large
part of the political pressure for enactment of the voucher bill; and (3)
during the legislative process the bill is most frequently discussed as a
parochial school aid plan, notwithstanding the wishes and objections of
other proponents of the bill. These possibilities also underscore the delicacy with which the Court will have to resolve a case falling between
Walz and Nyquist.

In the end, if under a voucher plan the existing religious schools are
the only schools outside of neighborhood public schools that are selected
by families in any significant numbers, many voucher proponents will view
the plan as a failure and will not resist its demise. On the other hand, if
a great deal of choice is exercised, voucher proponents would argue against
excluding religious schools from the voucher plan. Apart from their religious
training, these schools are likely to be an important source of diversity
in schooling.
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5. Additional Issues RegardingReligion
a. Access and Ritual
Normally, when an employer discriminates against a prospective employee on the basis of religion, we are properly offended because religion
has nothing to do with the job. But it is far less offensive for a religious
school to take as students only members of its faith, since one purpose of
the school is religious training. On the other hand, we may wish to require
all schools to maintain an open access policy, and indeed many students
who are not believers may nonetheless wish to attend the school because
of other attributes. In order to have an open access policy, some voucher
planners may think it also necessary to insist that participation in religious ritual be optional.
The Court's approach to administrative entanglement in Lemon casts
serious doubt on the viability of such rules. Yet it is not clear that the
entanglement caused through the enforcement of these rules need constitute a violation of the establishment clause: the rules are designed to
protect the associational and freedom of expression rights of individual
students; they are not likely to involve substantial state supervision of the
ongoing program, and religious schools unwilling to abide by such rules
could remain outside the plan.
It might be argued that private voucher schools are subject to constitutional standards because (1) the involvement of the state, (2) state
funding, and (3) the function that private voucher schools perform bring
their conduct within the "state action" doctrine. For the government to
discriminate on the basis of religion or to require religious ritual would
be impermissible. It should be noted, however, that the offsetting constitutional norm favoring the free exercise of religion may put religious
matters on a different footing from issues involving race or teacher and stu47
dent rights.
b. Teacher Selection
If the religion of a teacher is relevant to the job, then it seems appropriate to permit such discrimination. Yet, for many positions at private
religious schools, it is not clear that religious membership would be a
proper occupational qualification. Even so, whether the state should interfere with the private discretion of the school is a delicate question. Such
intrusion would limit the religious school's freedom, raise some administrative entanglement questions, and possibly run counter to the prefereices of the school users. On the other hand, it would protect the rights of
48
citizens to jobs supported through government funds.
47 See Choper, supra note 33, at 322 n.436.
48 It is noteworthy that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resolved this issue by fully

exempting religious educational institutions from its coverage to the extent that they discriminate
against their employees on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-1 (1970). I have been assuming
that these regulations of private schools with respect to students (and teachers) are optional
matters for the legislature or school district adopting a voucher plan. Even if the Constitution applies
to this area, it is still unclear what it would prohibit because of free exercise considerations.
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c. Exclusion of Religious Schools
Would exclusion of religious schools from participation in the voucher
plan raise serious constitutional questions? Plaintiffs have already lost on
theories that (1) state aid to parents wishing to exercise their Pierce
rights at religious schools is constitutionally compelled by the free exercise
or equal protection clauses, 4 9 (2) state aid which goes to users of private
nonreligious schools denies equal protection to users of private religious
schools,50 and (3) state aid which benefits poor people is a valid device for
enabling them to exercise freely their religious beliefs. 5' However, these
decisions were based on the assumption that the free exercise and equal
protection clauses may not require what the establishment clause forbids.
Suppose, however, the establishment clause does not forbid including
religious schools in the voucher plan. Is it now not an unconstitutional
act of hostility toward religion to exclude them? A variety of motives
might lie behind the exclusion. Favoring exclusion would be persons who
oppose full-time religious schools, those who see inclusion as constitutionally
unacceptable, and those who seek simply to avoid the constitutional quagmire. For the legislature to act on the pressures of the first group is hardly

a display of the neutrality which the Constitution demands. While it may
be argued that there is sufficient nonhostile reason (for example, the
quagmire fear) to protect the exclusion from attack, or that reasonable
concern about the Constitution's coverage can justify limiting the plan to
nonsectarian schools, these reasons and concerns go to matters which perhaps may be best resolved by the Court, particularly because of the fear
that anti-religious school feelings may account for the exclusion and the
effect that the exclusion has on exercise of religion. In short, the Constitution may allow the legislature no leeway on this question.
d. Definition of Religious Schools
One additional complication is that if religious schools are excluded,

either by statute or by the establishment clause, some religious schools
might seek to transform themselves into qualifying institutions. This then
requires constitutional or statutory definitions of what a religious school is.
While the Court easily identified prayers, 52 Bible reading, 53 and even a
ban on the teaching of evolution 54 as sufficiently religious to prohibit
their inclusion in public schools, it may be more difficult to decide whether
aiding a particular private school is aiding religion. Experience with conscientious objectors seeking an exemption from the draft on account of
religious beliefs 55 and with institutions seeking tax exempt status as re49
Jackson v. California, 460 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1972); Brusca v. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F.
Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971), affd mem., 405 U.S. 1050 (1972).
50 Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 833-35.
5, Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 788-89.
52 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
"' School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
54 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
's See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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ligious organizations5 6 may be of limited use as the private party in these
cases is seeking to be characterized as religious.
The Supreme Court in Nyquist sets out with little comment the findings of the lower court as to the characteristics of schools to which
parents could send their children and obtain tax benefits or tuition reimbursement.57 Institutions could
(a) impose religious restrictions on admissions; (b) require attendance of pupils
at religious activities; (c) require obedience by students to the doctrines and
dogmas of a particular faith; (d) require pupils to attend instruction in the theology or doctrine of a particular faith; (e)... [be] an integral part of the
religious mission of the church sponsoring it; (f) have as a substantial purpose
the inculcation of religious values; (g) impose religious restrictions on faculty
appointments; and (h) impose religious restrictions on what or how the faculty
may teach. 58
While a school with all these characteristics would certainly be a religious school, is any of these characteristics, standing alone, sufficient
to qualify the school as a religious school? The Court uses the phrase
"church-affiliated" at several points; if this is crucial what might it mean?
Suppose, for example, a Catholic elementary school, now located on church
grounds, is sold to a nonprofit corporation, none of the directors of which
are clerics. Assume further that all the teachers are lay persons, that no
religious exercise is carried on in the school, that the school certifies that
it is not controlled by any church, and that it does not discriminate in its
admissions or hiring on the basis of religion. Assume finally that it does
have a released-time program of the type approved by the Court in
Zorach v. Clzuson, 59 in which Catholic pupils receive religious instruction in the church next door. If ninety per cent of the students are Catholic
and nearly all of them participate in the released-time program, a very
difficult problem arises as to whether it is a religious school.6 0
Finally, with regard to religious schools, state constitutions may prohibit state aid in language which on its face appears to go further than
does the Federal Constitution's first amendment. 6' However, in view of
what has been said earlier about the free exercise clause, the Federal
Constitution may prevent the state "establishment clause" from reading
6 2
more broadly than does the first amendment's.
'6 See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3), as amended. This section exempts
institutions
which are organized and operated for religious purposes from taxation on related income.
57 413 U.S. at 767-68.

58 Id.

W.

59 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
60 For more examples of where this issue has arisen in somewhat analogous settings, see
LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTxTUTONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 799-805 (3d

ed. 1970).
61 See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. 11, § 3 (the so-called "Blaine Amendment"), which prohibits

"indirect" aid.
62

See, e.g., Areen, Public Aid to Nonpublic Schools: A Breach in the Sacred Wall?, 22 CASE W.

RES. L. REV. 230, 234-37 (1971).
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III
THE EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN VOUCHER SCHOOLS

A. School Variety
Voucher plans must resolve not only who is going to provide schooling
under the plan, but also what kind of schooling can be provided. The first
issue is how might and ought the state regulate what can be acquired
with an education voucher. As a practical solution, schools participating
in voucher plans might be required either to conform to the state's current rules for regulating private schools or conform to the more restrictive standards which apply to public schools. The plan might apply different standards to public and private participating schools, although
public schools might be at a substantial disadvantage if they were too
restrained.
As rules become more restrictive, it becomes more difficult to accommodate the preferences of families; in some states private school regulation
is already too limiting for many voucher advocates. 63 Perhaps the policy
decisions which may be faced by architects of voucher plans can be best
explored by listing a number of questions about things people might want.
Would mini-schools with less than fifteen students be allowed? What kind
of health and safety requirements would be imposed on school buildings?
Would the plan allow for schools which use the community as the school
facility, similar to the Parkway Program in Philadelphia? Can a student
split his time among a number of institutions so that his voucher is really
divisible and indeed similar to food stamps? If "program-splitting" were
permitted, would brokers be available to help people put together the
pieces of their educational program? Would artisans, parents, community
people, and others who do not hold teaching credentials be entitled to
teach? Could schools be essentially one-subject schools such as art or
music schools or would they have to offer a broad curricular range, particularly at the elementary level? Would teaching racism, communism, or
any other political viewpoint be prohibited and if so, what consequences
would follow? Might children of all ages be grouped together and taught
at once or grouped so that older children taught younger ones? Many of
these varieties of school experiences are not permitted under existing
state laws and are rarely included in public school experimentation.
Voucher experiments with minimum restraints should be tried. Perhaps
it would be most appropriate for the state to restrict only activities clearly
dangerous to the child's health and safety, or directly threatening to the
public welfare such as teaching or encouraging children to engage in
criminal conduct. 64 At the same time, there are minimum restrictions
63 See, for example, the problems faced by the Santa Fe Community School described in
D. KiRP & M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAw 48-52 (1974), and New Schools Ex-

change Newsletter, Feb. 15, 1974.
64 These propositions are derived fromJ. CooNs & S.
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which the state might demand. Some might relate to curriculum, such as a
requirement that at least reading and math be taught through the eighth
grade. 65 There might also be requirements of minimum school day length
and minimum length of the school year, although this is an area in which
the experimental program ought to tread lightly.
A related matter is the extent to which the plan will regulate the relationship of participating schools-particularly private schools-and their
teachers. At least three concerns are important to teachers: (1) employment
discrimination, (2) academic freedom, and (3) unionization and collective
bargaining. Participating public schools would probably undergo little
change in these respects. Teachers could file discrimination claims pursuant
to the nineteenth century civil rights acts, 66 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,67 and, assuming the school were receiving federal aid, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.68 Discrimination against teachers by private
schools would also be covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,69
where jurisdictional requirements are met,7 0 and by the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.7'
Academic freedom of public school teachers, to the extent covered by
the first amendment, is largely protected by constitutional decisions relating to teacher conduct both inside7 2 and out of 3 the classroom. Public
school teachers are also likely to be protected against arbitrary firing by
state laws which provide that tenured teachers may be terminated only
for "cause." But unless participating private schools were found to be
public enough so that their acts constituted "state action," the constitutional protections of academic freedom would be unavailable to teachers
in those schools. 7 4 Perhaps the voucher rules could provide that schools
must respect first amendment rights of teachers and grant due process
hearings in connection with certain dismissals.
Public school teachers may be protected by collective bargaining agreements, or by school board rules which serve the same function in states
where public employee unions are still technically illegal. A voucher plan
would complicate bargaining arrangements, however. Individual public
65 Id.

66 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (race), 1983 (1970).
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), 2000e-2(a) (1970) (race, color, religion, sex, national origin). In

1972, Public Law 92-261 extended Title VII to include both educational institutions and state
and68local employers. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103 (Mar. 24, 1972).
See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §901, 86 Stat. 235, 304-05
(June 23, 1972), which appears to apply to teachers although it was clearly aimed at students.
69

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).

There must be fifteen or more employed and the employer must be engaged in interstate
commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2) 86 Stat. 103
(Mar. 24, 1972). The amending legislation provides for a reduction in the number of employees
necessary to quality from twenty-five to fifteen. Many private schools may not satisfy the numerical
test and, even if Congress has acted to the full extent of its constitutional authority, many private schools may not satisfy the commerce requirement either.
,7 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (race) (1970). See Young v. International Tel. & Tel., 438 F.2d 757 (3d
Cir. 21971).
7 See, e.g., Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
73 See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
U See the discussion of "state action" at p. 537 infra.
70
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schools might want negotiations at the school level, and might wish
flexibility in pay schedules and staffing not now practically possible in the
public sector, such as merit pay, high-paid master teachers, replacement
of teachers with lower-paid paraprofessionals, and so on. To the extent
that teachers' unions imposed uniform pay scales and class size limits on
the public voucher schools, the responsiveness of those schools to family
demand could be inhibited. On the other hand, individually participating
public voucher schools might fear "whipsawing" and would seek to expand
the negotiating unit to include the entire voucher area, even across current school district boundaries. The negotiating unit might be two-tiered,
with certain issues dealt with on an area-wide basis and others decided
at the building level.
Unless changed by voucher plan legislation, where private school
teachers are concerned, the applicable collective bargaining rules would
be those of the private sector. If the National Labor Relations Board took
jurisdiction over private elementary and secondary schools, the collective
bargaining rules might be more favorable to teachers than are those now
covering public employees.75 To date, unionization of private school teachers
is not widespread, primarily because of the historic pattern of using
teaching nuns and priests in Catholic schools. But with the increasing use of
lay teachers in religious schools, unionization in private schools might become more common.
B. Access Rules: Families Versus Schools Versus Other Families
It is too simplistic to suggest that since voucher plans imply family
choice, families will obtain what they want for their children. Two important competing factors are the providers' desire to have particular kinds of
children in their schools, and the desire of families to have their children
attend school with particular kinds of classmates. Since tastes will clash,
limiting the freedom of some is inevitable.
1. Families Versus Schools
If the voucher plan is to reflect the conditions of the free market,
suppliers should provide education only for those students they wish to
serve, and should adopt rules suited to what they perceive to be in their
own best interests. They might take all students who applied, restrict their
enrollment to the first X number who wish to attend, classify students on
the basis of various criteria, select applicants by lot, and so forth. Such
rule-making will obviously restrict the freedom of some families to send
their children to the school of their choice. In order to meet the concern that
some children will be arbitrarily labeled as undesirable and thereby precluded
from enrolling in certain schools, it may be necessary to restrict supplier
freedom.
75Currently it appears that the NLRB will assume jurisdiction in disputes involving a private
school when the school has annual revenues of$1 million. See The Windsor School Inc., 82 L.R.R.M.
1341 (1972). There also would be a question of the Board's power to exert jurisdiction over
private voucher schools because of the "interstate commerce" requirement of the NLRA.
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In addition, the issue as to what extent private voucher schools will be subject
to constitutional restraints arises in connection with the enrollment, exclusion,
and treatment of students. Aside from matters of racial discrimination, the existing line of judicial authority indicates that the administration of private schools
does not constitute "state action," meaning that constitutional guarantees applicable to public school administration are not applicable to private school administration. 76 Notwithstanding these cases, the issue under a voucher plan is
more complicated, since the government will have embraced family choice
as public policy; hence, the private schools participating in the plan may
be more clearly seen as performing a state function than do private schools
today.77 It might also be said that the state has abdicated the performance of an essential state function to private parties, who, by their assumption of the responsibility, become the state, at least for certain purposes.7 8 Moreover, statutory regulation of private school conduct is likely
plan, and hence state-private school ties will
to increase under a voucher
79
become more complex.
On the other hand, considering the schooling enterprise as a whole, the
adoption of a voucher plan may be seen as a retreat by the state from its
current intervention in the lives of children and hence a strange step from
which to find "state action" arising. From a different perspective, it may
be argued that so long as vouchers are used at public schools as well as
private schools, no monopolization of a state activity by private parties
occurs as in other "state action" cases.8 0 As for the "regulation" argument,
it seems odd that additional regulation of private schools, which is for the
purpose of giving students and their families greater protection against
providers than they would have at common law, should be sufficient as
a bootstrap to bring the "state action" doctrine into play; for this would
then invoke yet additional restrictions which presumably were deliberately
not included in the statutory scheme. In the end the question is whether
the courts will view private voucher schools as essentially public schools
with respect to which the state has simply delegated its authority. Perhaps
the "state action" issue will have to be determined by the nature of the
particular voucher plan involved.
It should be added that while recent right-to-education litigation is based
on the argument that students may not be excluded from public schools
81
on the ground of "inability to benefit" from education, the considerations
are somewhat different when many schools rather than one school are
available. Hence while the state may not be able to deny a voucher to a
76 See, e.g., Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382
(N.D. Ind. 1970). See generally D. Kim, & M. YUDOF, supra note 63, at 86-87.
77 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
7' See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
7 Cf Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
" See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
81 See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modfied, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
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child if that is how schooling is to be financed, this does not mean that
every student must be guaranteed his or her choice of schools, private or
public. The "right to an education" would not seem to imply a constitutional ban on reasonable academic grouping, at least where racial considerations are not involved.
It is difficult to tell to what extent limits on "refusals to sell" will keep
schools out of the voucher market. Clearly, elite schools will be disappointed if they cannot discriminate on the basis of academic talent. Even
if suppliers are to be restricted, many access models are still possible. One is
the state university model in which schools are entitled to restrict admissions
on the basis of some previously announced and educationally reasonable criteria.
This approach aims primarily at preventing arbitrariness and invidiousness. A
second model is the telephone company model in which, just as all can obtain
telephone service, schools are required, in effect, to make room for any student
who wants to enroll. Some community colleges and the City University of New
York have adopted this model. It aims to give much more power to families visi-vis providers. Of course, there are compromise plans--for example, a school
could restrict its size and select a portion of its students as it wished as long
as it also accepted a specified portion on demand or, if there is excess demand,
by lot.8 2 Choosing among the possible rules requires a careful weighing
of (1) how much we ought to interfere on behalf of unwanted children,
(2) what the behavioral response of providers will be, (3) the interests
of others, and (4) how well the rule can be policed.8 3 Finally, if admissions
policies are restricted, the question is raised whether academic and similar
84
decisions by these schools are to be similarly restricted.
2. Families Versus Other Families
Other children will be seen by certain families as assets or liabilities,
and hence resources to be sought out or avoided when families make
choices concerning their own children. A family may not want its child to
go to school with troublemakers or with ugly children or with children
who are stupid. It may seek to band together with families having children
with certain characteristics. This is the familiar, if difficult, problem of
how tolerant we should be of freedom of association when a group wishes
to exercise it in a way that seeks the freedom not to associate with cer82
This is the proposal of the Center for the Study of Public Policy. See note 18 supra.
'3 Professor Coons and I have suggested a rule which would allow a school to set a ceiling
on enrollment and to select the first fifteen pupils of its choice on any basis it desired (other than
on race); others would be admitted on demand and excess demand would be settled by lot.
J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, FAMILY CHOICE SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO THE NEw YORK STATE'
COMMISSION ON ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (1971).
SSuppose. a dancing school is prevented from refusing to admit those it judges to have
limited potential. If a clumsy person enrolls and does not learn, may he then be excluded? Ought
he be allowed to insist on progressing to the advanced classes despite his failure to master the basic
steps? Not only is the satisfaction of teachers and managers of the dancing school at stake. What
about the interests of others in the class? Perhaps in most cases the school and student will agree
on what is best for the student or, what is much the same, the school will agree to the student's
choice because of economic pressure. But this cannot be counted on in every instance and hence
some policy decisions must be made.
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tain people. A system which would permit exclusivity would permit the
adoption of standards which might be constitutional, but might have the
effect of causing many low IQ children, disruptive children, and ugly children to be relegated to places which they have chosen as last resorts. That
is, the exclusivity by some families may close off the free choice of others.
On the other hand, inclusiyity may be seen to "ruin" it for the group; 5
sympathy for this problem must be substantial, although it may vary depending on the reasons the child is not wanted.
A rule of inclusivity with an exception for fifteen selected children is
perhaps a good compromise. It would permit restrictive parents who wish
very small schools for their children to have them on an exclusive basis,
while assuring that any enterprise of a larger scale would be open to all.
Turning this preference for inclusivity over exclusivity into a reality, however,
may pose substantial difficulties as the informal system of counseling and
other pressures will probably tend to deter families from sending children
to places where they are not really welcome.
C. Racial Integration
Critics of voucher plans are concerned about the impact of the plans
on racial integration in schools. Clearly, unlimited choice and racial quotas
are ultimately contradictory. Even if racial balance were a more important value than choice, it is inappropriate to compare estimates of racial
balance under a voucher plan with a non-voucher world in which there is
absolute racial balance in every school. The appropriate comparison must
be with an objective appraisal of the prospects for racial integration in
the schools without vouchers. Few school districts will voluntarily merge
for the sole purpose of improving racial balance within their schools.
Hence, in the absence of political pressures for district mergers, the best
that can be hoped for is racial balance within school districts.8 6
"' The problem of disruptive children, for example, is a difficult one. Should they be involun-

tarily segregated or should they be distributed in the hope that exposure to others will not only
change their behavior but also teach other children to cope with this kind of problem? Handicapped
86 children may present a similar problem.
This is especially true now that the United States Supreme Court has held that interdistrict
busing cannot be ordered unless all districts involved are found to have engaged in racial discrimination. Milliken v. Bradley, 42 U.S.L.W. 5249 (U.S.July 25,1974). Consolidation of attendance
zones of the Richmond, Virginia, area was rejected by the Fourth Circuit after having been ordered
by the district court. See Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), affd by an equally
divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973) (Powell, J., not participating). Justice Powell's opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 238-48 (1973), suggests
that he is opposed to remedies which involve long distance busing that would be required in metropolitan integration plans, and that he is opposed to the limits such a remedy would impose on the
freedom of families who live in the suburbs to attend local community schools.
Nonjudicial pressures for district mergers could include financial incentives built into state
school finance schemes. See MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 388.267-68, 388.690, 388.1121(6),
388.1181(2), 388.1241 (1973). However, some financial factors usually stand in the way of school
district mergers; reliance on local revenues for the financing of schools makes richer districts
unfriendly toward poorer neighbors that are potential partners. See Sweetwater County Planning
Comm'n v. Hinckle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971). Pressures for some interdistrict cooperation
are increasing; for example, vocational and special education programs are now commonly provided on a regional basis. See MICH. Comip. LAws ANN. §§ 340.291a, 340.307a et seq., 340.320a
et seq. (1973). This is a long way from an actual merger, however.
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With regard to the prospects of intradistrict integration, it seems
likely that a number of northern cities will be found in violation of the Brown"7
and Swann8 8 decisions, hence subject to racial balance orders, as a result of
the Court's decision in the Denver case last year.8 9 Hence, a realistic target
of the integration movement might appear to be racial balance in most large
school districts where minorities now attend racially isolated schools.
While integration appears presently feasible for most blacks, it is not
so for most whites, since enormous numbers of whites live in suburban
white segregated school districts.9 0 The trend continues to be away from
white attendance at city schools. Certainly in many large cities the prospect is that whites will be in the minority in most public schools. 9 1 In addition, once a district has been operating a unitary school system within
the command of Swann for a period of time, it may no longer be under
an obligation to maintain racially balanced schools. 92
By way of contrast, what are the possibilities for integration under a
voucher plan? One potential result, of course, is that whites would flee
from integrated programs, set up private schools, and block the entry of
black students, thereby setting back the limited progress toward integration that has already occurred. Alternatively, blacks might flock to currently all white suburban and private schools, reducing the heavy concentrations of blacks in the inner city public schools and bringing about integration in schools which would otherwise have remained all white. Either
projection is too simplistic; there are pressures for and against both, and
for an array of other possibilities. Moreover, the constitutional and legislative limits that formally constrain a voucher plan, plus any incentives
that may be built into a plan, will be very important to the ultimate distribution of whites and non-whites among the schools.
In addition, racial balance in all schools is not so clearly an appropriate
policy result. There are virtues of pluralism, of accepting family associational decisions even when they mean racial isolation, particularly if there
are no formal barriers to students on account of race and there are clear opportunities available for integration. The Supreme Court itself, in Norwood v.
Harrison, has shown that it adheres to these values through its recent and
87 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Swann held that the district
court could properly find that a neighborhood school policy was an insufficient remedy for past
de jure segregation if the effect of neighborhood assignment was to continue one-race schools.
89 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Keyes suggests that any substantial past
segregation is sufficient to make out a violation. Id. at 198-200. It is likely that some past attendance
zone line drawing or new school site choice decisions of most large city school districts can be characterized as racially motivated. See Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There Is But One Con.
stitution, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 1 (1972).
90 In New York in 1970-71, 74.4 per cent of the state's "white" pupils attended segregated
schools--those with less than 10 per cent minority students. NEw YoR STATE COmssiSSoN ON
THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, supra note 8,
at 4.4.
9" In New York City over 65 per cent of the public school population consists of minority
pupils. Neighboring Nassau County has 9.2 per cent minority students. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 3,
1974, § 4, at 3, cols. 1, 3.
92 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 31-32.
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continued affirmation of the viability of Pierce, together with its seeming
recognition that private schools are not constitutionally forbidden to exist
even if they discriminate. 93 Further, Norwood suggests that a legislature
could not adopt a law which provided that attendance at a racially discriminatory private school would not satisfy the compulsory attendance
laws.

94

A variety of remedies appear to be available for blacks who are discriminated against by voucher schools on the basis of race. Of course, the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause would continue to apply
to racial discrimination by public voucher schools. But what about participating "private" schools? First, and perhaps most important, it now seems
clear that blacks will be able to make an equal protection claim even if
the discrimination is by "private" schools. The Norwood opinion voided
Mississippi's textbook aid plan to the extent that books were provided to
children attending private schools which discriminated on the basis of
race. 95 Acknowledging that racially exclusive private schools may serve
important associational interests, and conceding that the textbook aid
plan's purpose might legitimately have been to assist in the education of
all children (that is, regardless of whether their parents decided to enroll
them in white-only schools), the Court concluded that the state may not
lend its support to private discrimination in this manner. Indeed, as the
state was providing tangible benefits, the Court did not really consider
seriously whether there was a real "state action" issue. It swept aside the
state's argument that the textbook aid should be upheld on the same basis
as textbook aid to children attending religious schools.9 6 The Court
further rejected the argument that if textbooks may not be provided,
then fire and police protection and other municipal services also could
not be provided to these schools on the ground that such municipal services are effectively monopolized by government and cannot be obtained
by the private schools elsewhere. Books, by contrast, could be obtained
privately. Further, the Court called the books a "basic educational tool,"
which unlike fire services but like education tuition grants, were "provided
97
only in connection with schools.1
The point of this seems to be that since, in the Court's view, the basic
school system is public, the state may not then provide aid to the substitute private school sector if the effect of the aid is to support discrimination in schooling. The Court made explicit its approval of previous lower

court opinions, some of which it had earlier affirmed without opinion, hold93 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 461-63 (1973).
94

Id.

95Id. at 455.

"6See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court in Norwood argued that in
Allen, while the textbook aid did not amount to the establishment of religion, the effect of the
state action was to enhance the free exercise of religion, a valuable right given independent
protection in other contexts; by contrast, while the private white-only schools may have served
interests in freedom of association, the effect of the aid was to enhance discrimination against
others on the basis of race, an interest clearly not deserving constitutional protection.
97 413 U.S. at 465.
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ing tuition grants to children attending private discriminatory schools to
be invalid. 98 Thus the provision of vouchers to children attending schools
which only admit whites will very probably be found unconstitutional.
Even without a finding of "state action," it appears that if blacks are
excluded from private voucher schools on the basis of race, they have a
private right of action against the school under section 1981 of Title 42 of
the United States Code.99 Inasmuch as the refusal to admit blacks is seen
as the refusal to enter into a contract on the basis of race, it contravenes
the provisions of section 1981, enacted by Congress in order to enforce
the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against slavery and involuntary
servitude. 10 0 This has led to renewed interest in actions attacking private
discrimination. In Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc.,t0 1 a federal dis-

trict court in Virginia found section 1981 applicable and awarded black
families, whose children were denied admission to a white-only private
school, both damages and injunctive relief. As of this writing, the de102
cision is on appeal; it does seem consistent with prior cases, however.
The Court has intimated that perhaps "truly private" discrimination would
be immune from attack.' 0 3 Yet notwithstanding the notion in Pierce that
the state may not constitutionally eliminate the family's right to educate
its child privately, it does not appear that a white-only school, which, as
an institution, offers services to members of the white community, would
meet the "truly private" test.'0 4 Perhaps a small communally run school in
which the parents of the enrolled do the teaching would. The main hope for
private schools would appear, ironically, to come from Norwood in which the
Court stated that private schools which discriminate may exist, observing that
such discrimination does not "invoke any sanction of laws." 10 5 The Court also
noted the "other significant contexts" in which Congress had made unlawful discrimination involving private parties. 10 8 These dicta suggest
that the Court either believes that section 1981 does not apply to private
school discrimination or that it did not have that possibility in mind.
Finally, it is quite likely that participants in a voucher plan of the sort
described herein would be protected by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 which prohibits discrimination in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance.' 0 7 Not only are schools in experimental voucher
plans likely to receive special federal assistance, but school districts gen98 Id.at 463 n.6.
" As noted earlier, this provision is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Larson,
The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wisc. L. REv. 470, 501-02.
100Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
101 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
102 Many of these cases, like Mayer, were brought under section 1982, but the Court, in Tiliman
v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973), has held that section 1981 and section 1982 are similar except that the former deals with contracts and the latter with property.
103
See Tillman, 410 U.S. at 438; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969).
10 4
See 26 VAND. L. REv. 1307 (1973).
105413 U.S. at 469.
10 Id. at 470 & n.10.
107 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). Unlike section 1981, which is limited to discrimination on the basis
of race, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to discrimination on the basis of race, color,
or national origin.
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erally would presumably continue to receive federal aid and would distribute it among the participating schools, including the private voucher
schools. Were such schools to discriminate, not only would this invoke the
threat of the cut-off of federal funds by HEW officials, 10 8 but it now
appears that the prohibition may be privately enforced by injured
students.1 0 9
A court might find that a voucher plan was adopted for the purpose
of avoiding racial balance (or perhaps of allowing whites to avoid such
balance) and hence hold it unconstitutional, regardless of effect." 0 But
if the intent to discriminate cannot be shown, how will a voucher plan
which results in some one-race schools be treated? Swann indicates that
the response may vary. If a district is under a recent court order to desegregate or has just implemented a desegregation plan, then a voucher plan
may not be allowed if, as a result, the district, including all voucher schools,
fails the Swann tests. Even this situation may be distinguishable from
Swann, however, since in that case some black students could complain
that the neighborhood assignment plan required them to remain in their
formerly all-black schools, while under a voucher plan, at least formally,
the imbalanced schools would be by choice. While in Green v. County
School Board,"' the Court rejected the district's "choice" plan as inadequate, it is important to note that there (1) the schools were initially
completely segregated, and (2) in its original form, the plan assigned
students to their old schools unless they affirmatively chose others. And
finally, Green again is a case of a district in the process of court-ordered
desegregation, imposed as a result of past discrimination.
This leaves us with the toughest cases: racially balanced districts which
become imbalanced as a result of the voucher plan." 2 In order to assess
the results, the question must first be asked whether blacks still have
ample opportunity for integration. If so, and if this can be documented not
only by its theoretical availability through choice, but through the existence of integrated schools, then there is much less reason to fear that
all-black schools represent anything but black choice. Moreover, assuming
again that there are ample opportunities for integration, we should be
cautious before surmising that where there are all-white schools, they
secretly have discouraged black attendance; otherwise blacks may be
forced to attend with whites at school X when they are happier attending with whites at school Y. In these circumstances, and where there
101See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
109
See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
10
'
See Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), in which the school
district had closed its public schools and vouchers were made available to those attending private
schools. But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), which suggests that the search for purpose is fruitless and that Griffin rests on the impermissible effect of the district's action. Still, since
Prince Edward County had been ordered to desegregate its public school system and instead closed
the schools and adopted a voucher plan for students at private schools which did discriminate, it
is not clear just what effect the Court considered to be the crucial one.
11 391 U.S. 430 (1968).

112 There is also the issue raised in Swann of the time period which must pass after a district
has become a unitary system. 402 U.S. at 31-32.
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are integrated schools available, to object to racial imbalance may now be
a matter of social philosophy-that what is "best" is that whites and
blacks attend together whether or not some blacks want schools in which
they are predominant and whether or not they wish to attend with certain
whites. Perhaps this is the view one "ought" to have (it is rather contrary
to the notions about family and state inherent in vouchers); yet so long as
blacks and whites have opportunities to attend together, it is not clear that
the Constitution forbids or should forbid the racial imbalance which results.113
On the other hand, the legislature may constrain the voucher plan by
requiring racial balance. A variety of approaches are possible. First, voucher
legislation could provide that only schools which meet certain racial balance
tests may participate in the plan. Each school need not necessarily mirror
the district's (or area's) racial composition; rather some leeway (plus
or minus fifteen per cent of the district average, for example) could be
allowed. To stimulate rather than to command racial balance, integrated
schools could be awarded a bonus. Another alternative would be to give
minority race students first access to available places, or lotteries which
are held in cases of over-enrollment could be undertaken separately by
race with positions assigned pro rata so as to eliminate any imbalance
arising from random selection.
D. Limiting Vouchers to Special Programs
or Types of Students
While most voucher proposals assume that increased family choice
would affect all children, it is obviously possible to limit the use of vouchers
to families or children with specific characteristics. For example, if the
central purpose of vouchers were viewed as increasing choice for poor
11 4
families, state funded vouchers could be provided only to poor families.
While everyone else remained under the present rules, children of poor
families could transfer out of their existing public schools to other public
and private schools chosen by the family.
Under such a plan, it would be necessary to decide whether the
private schools should be limited to voucher students, thus serving only
poor families. If private school enrollment were not limited and existing
113

Such a situation surfaced not long ago in Berkeley, California. In the past, the Berkeley

school district had voluntarily desegregated and also developed an elaborate experimental schools
program in which a variety of alternative experiences were offered. One of those was called Black
House, with an all-black teaching staff as well as student body (which comprised less than five
per cent of the total black enrollment of the district). While whites apparently were not formally
excluded, the nature of the school was such that it would be unlikely that whites would wish to
attend-among other things it was very much oriented toward developing racial pride. In Berkeley,
neither blacks nor whites find it difficult to obtain racial integration for their children. While
some might believe that racial balance ought to be imposed on all students notwithstanding the
views of some black families, such a policy goes beyond the kind of intrusion we have come to
expect from the state, even on racial issues. For a description of the Berkeley situation and a constitutional analysis of "minority" public schools of choice, see Appleton, Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitution, the Civil Rights Act and the Berkeley Experiment, 61 CALIF. L. RaV.
858 11(1973).
4
See Sizer & Whitten, A Proposalfor a Poor Children's Bill of Rights, 2 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Aug. 1968, at 58.
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private schools could turn away voucher students and/or charge additional
tuition, then these private schools would not be a real option for many
poor families using vouchers. Architects of a poor-only voucher plan should
also be concerned with determining who will qualify as a poor family and
with insuring that voucher children are not unfairly stigmatized. Finally,
they should consider the political realities of adopting a plan limited to the
poor. Some opponents of vouchers generally would probably favor pooronly voucher plans, while some current proponents of vouchers would
lose interest in, and in some cases oppose, their adoption if limited to the
poor.
Vouchers could also be limited to children now inadequately served by
the public schools because of certain characteristics of the child. Indeed,
some states already provide vouchers for handicapped children." 5 Some
states may offer vouchers for the handicapped today because the public
schools do not want to educate these children. The question of whether
these children have the constitutional right to public education, indeed
a public education suited to their special needs, is currently being litigated.11 6 Whether the public sector could meet its constitutional obligationtoward such children-if a constitutional right to public education is recognized by the courts-through an "adequate" voucher might become an
important question. On the other hand, there are families with exceptional
children who are quite dissatisfied with the public schooling now available; if such children have a right to attend a public school, do they also
have a right to a voucher if the program offered by the public school is
not suited to their needs?
Similar questions arise if the use of vouchers is confined to non-English
speaking students. They too are seeking a declaration of their constitutional
right to adequate public education. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 these children have an enforceable
7
right to special instruction which recognizes their language problems."
Since the interest of these children and their parents is primarily in learning English, providing vouchers which could be exercised in private programs of their choice might be welcomed by most families, at least until
the children learned to speak English and could understand what goes on
in an ordinary classroom. On the other hand, may the school district
satisfy its obligation by providing only the voucher option instead of setting up public school classrooms in which these children could understand and learn?
ns See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6871 (West 1969).
See Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet Revolution, 24 HAST. L.J. 1087

(1973); Kirp, supra note 4.
117 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). Pursuant to Title VI, section 602, of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), the Department of Health, Education and Welfare issued
guidelines in 1970 providing that "where inability to speak and understand the English language
excludes national origin-minority group children from effective participation in the educational
program offered by a school district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language
deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these students." 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595
(1970). See Sugarman & Widess, Equal Protectionfor Non-English-Speaking School Children: Lau v.

Nichols, 62

CALIF.

L. REv. 157 (1974).
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Another approach is to limit the vouchers to children with certain
educational objectives, particularly those objectives for which the private
sector may have more expertise and for which the public sector has obvious shortcomings. Vocational education (at least for some vocations) is
a likely candidate for this approach.
A different approach would be to provide vouchers for children in
schools that fail, or to individual children whom the schools fail. Two
examples illustrate this idea. If the average reading score of students
at a public school is sufficiently far behind national averages (or local
averages, or historical averages, or averages of students matched by background), then the school would be declared "bankrupt" and the revenue
of that school turned over to the families of the students in that school
in the form of vouchers to be used as they wish. 118 This approach could
also be adapted to classes or grades within a school. In the alternative,
if a student, after a certain period of time, has not mastered the basic
skills taught by the public school or has fallen so far behind his or her
peers (due to the school's fault) then the family would be given a
voucher to enroll the child elsewhere.
As a final example, vouchers could be used as supplements to the
present public school system. For example, "school stamps" could be used
for after-school, weekend, or summer educational experiences. There are
special reasons for limiting these supplemental vouchers to the poor. Currently, an important way in which the lives of children of poor families
differ from those of wealthier children is in what they do with their outof-school time. Poor children typically do not have private music or dance
lessons, private tutoring, opportunities for summer camp, and the like. It
has been further suggested that summer experiences (or their lack) count
for much of the school achievement variations between rich and poor
children." 9 As a general matter, a political advantage of extra-school
voucher proposals is that they do not so directly confront the existing public
education establishment; a disadvantage however, is that they will do
little to affect the major portion of children's educational experiences.
IV
VOUCHER PLANS AND OTHER SCHOOL REFORMS

A. Finance Reform Through Vouchers
School finance reform has been urged ever since education became
publicly financed. In recent years, lawyers have led the reform efforts, having
taken cues from the earlier writings of educators, education economists,
and school administrators. 20 However, while much of the force behind educa11' This interesting metaphor was proposed to me by Robert J. Singleton of the Education
Finance Reform Project in Los Angeles.
" See, e.g., Hayes & Grether, The School Year and Vacations: When Do Students Learn?,

Apr. 19, 1969 (paper presented at the Eastern Sociological Association Convention).
120 See, e.g., C. BENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (2d ed. 1968).
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tional reform historically has been directed at increased spending for public
education, 121 most current legal commentators have devoted their attention
toward resource reallocation, with a view toward diminishing educational
22
inequalities.1

Three categories of inequality have been attacked in the courts: inequalities
among school districts, inequalities among schools within districts, and inequalities among students. These inequalities arise from different causes.
Most of the legal attack has concentrated on interdistrict inequalities which
arise because districts have access to widely varying tax bases for generating
educational funds. 123 To some, the remedy for this inequality lies in assuring
some notion of equality of educational spending. 24 This at least may be stated
as a negative principle: spending from district to district should not vary as a
result of local tax base or tax effort. This principle allows for variations based
upon rational education policies, such as cost variations among districts and
variations in pupil needs. To other reformers, a sufficient judicial remedy has
meant eliminating variations in expenditures arising out of tax base differences,
25
and not those arising out of tax effort differences.
Whether vouchers would have any effect on the interdistrict disparity
problem would depend in large part upon whether the plan permitted families
to choose public schools located outside their present school district. If this
were accomplished by having the state take over the entire school revenue
raising function, then the problem of interdistrict disparities would disappear.
It is difficult to see a revenue-raising role for school districts if there is to be
choice across district lines. The system might employ transfer payments from
"sending" to "receiving" districts as is done today in rather rare examples of
approved transfers. However, if the amount of the payment were the amount
spent in the receiving district, this could become an intolerable burden on
poorer sending districts; and if the amount were the amount spent in the
sending district, this could be enormously burdensome on receiving districts.
Either rule would set up dysfunctional incentives to deter choice. It is unclear
whether the long-run political chances for voucher plans are increased or
diminished if district-crossing is allowed. Families in desired districts may protest district line crossing, as may teachers and administrators in less desirable
See, e.g., E. CUBBERLEY, SCHOOL FUNDS AND THEIR APPORTIONMENT (1905).
'2 See, e.g., Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 411, 472
n.322 (1973).
12' From the viewpoint of the reformers, the high point thus far in the legal battle over interdistrict inequalities has been the California Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), when the court indicated that these inequalities are unconstitutional, while the low point was the U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 decision in
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), which rejected that claim,
at least on federal grounds. Despite the dismissal of the reformers' constitutional claims in Rodriguez,
there has been significant reform carried out in many state legislatures, both before and after
Rodriguez. For a discussion of such reform, see Grubb, The First Round of Legislative Reforms in the
Post-Serrano World, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 459 (1974). Yet, taking the country as a whole,
substantial interdistrict disparities within states are still common.
124 See, e.g., A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS (1968).
12' We have attempted to capture this idea in what we have called Proposition I: "the
quality of public education may not be a function of wealth other than the total wealth of the state." J.
COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN,
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 304 (1970).
Ill
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districts. In view of the current suburban-urban political power balance, interdistrict choice may be effectively precluded. If dissatisfaction with public schools
increases, particularly in the suburbs, the balance of power may shift.
Intradistrict inequalities arise due to district level policies concerning the
allocation of district resources. There has been surprisingly little litigation
on this question despite the 1971 victory by plaintiffs in Hobson v. Hansen12 6 in
the District of Columbia. Hobson ordered that per pupil expenditures in any
single elementary school should not deviate more than five per cent from the
mean, excluding Tide I ESEA funds, UPO funds, and funds not from the
12 7
regular budget. In the past year a similar suit has been filed in Los Angeles.
The typical systemic cause of intradistrict inequalities in expenditures per
pupil is the allocation of teachers so that some schools have higher salaried
teachers than others, although there may be no difference in the pupil-teacher
ratios among the schools in a district. Often this allocation is due to the seniority
transfer rule, under which openings go first to senior teachers in the district.
In the long run, older teachers tend to concentrate in certain schools. To the
extent that teacher salary differences are unrelated to teacher quality but are,
for example, family security-based (those with years on the job deserve more
pay because the families of older workers need more money than those of
younger ones), it is seemingly more appropriate to allocate teacher positions
rather than teacher salary dollars among schools. This is particularly so if schools
themselves have little power over their teaching personnel, especially to discharge cost ineffective higher paid teachers. On the other hand, to the extent
that salary differences reflect competence differences, the allocation of teaching
slots together with a system of unequal distribution of teacher talent seems
unfair to schools which wind up with more low paid (and less competent)
teachers. Studies suggest that higher pay may correlate somewhat, but only
somewhat, with teacher effectiveness. 128 Of course, teachers need not be distributed evenly by salary levels; schools with low paid teachers can simply
be given more of them. Although a district must substantially reduce intradistrict inequalities in order to receive federal Title I funds,129 the "comparability" among schools that is required under the Title I regulations is based
on teacher salary dollars per pupil after the deduction of longevity payments."30
A voucher plan in which each child's voucher was wrrth the same amount
would be consistent with the equal-teacher-salary dollar notion of equality.
Hence, vouchers might be viewed as a way of eliminating the inequality attacked
in Hobson. However, if a plan contemplates public sector choice with no substan128 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971). This case followed an earlier decision emphasizing racial
discrimination and tracking in which the district court did not order an equal-resource remedy,
even though it found the existing resource patterns to be unconstitutional; it believed that the

remedy for the other violations would deal with the resource problem. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hansen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
127 Arellano v. Board of Educ., Civil No. C27,836 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 20, 1972).
128 For a heroic attempt of a court to deal with the views of social scientists, see Hobson v.
Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
129 Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(3)(C)
(1970).
130 45 C.F.R. 116.26 (1973). See LAwYERs' COMMI'rrEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, A MANUAL
FOR ENFORCING TITLE I COMPARABILITY (1973).

FAMILY CHOICE

tial increase in total spending, schools that start out with senior teachers would
face a cost squeeze unless they can transfer out such teachers or attract substantial enrollment increases in the first year of the plan. Even if all extra
teacher dollars meant extra teacher quality, some public schools, because of
historic considerations, would have to maintain staffs largely composed of
high paid teachers even if that school's consumers did not want such teachers.
On the other hand, perhaps/ natural attrition plus some transitional financial
assistance would solve this' roblem.
Related factors that give rise to intrad*strict inequalities must also be considered under any voucher plan in whichublic school choice was permitted.
Some existing schools necessarily have higher costs-for example, maintenance
and repair costs are higher in older buildings. More significant problems are
the varying quality and degree of indebtedness associated with existing physical
plants of public schools and new private schools that want to participate but
do not y etave buildings. These matters raise issues beyond the scope of this
article bu t they illustrate that the simple rule of an equal value voucher for
every child may, in reality, be very much unequal. 13 1 From another perspective, equality among schools may be seen as a question of the ability of schools
to compete fairly with each other for students; subsidies beyond the voucher
value may be needed to insure this ability.
Resource reallocation suits dealing with inequalities among children,
the third category of inequality, have pressed for an equality based upon needs,
which requires a disproportionate distribution of resources. For example, in
1 32
Mclnnis v. Shapiro
the plaintiffs asked for a constitutional determination
that resources must be distributed according to pupil needs, claiming that socalled culturally disadvantaged children need extra funds spent on their education. Clearly, this concerns a notion of output equality rather than input equality.
Similarly, in exclusion suits brought by handicapped children, plaintiffs seek
not merely admission to school, but access to a program suited to their needs,
which in many cases will cost more than the ordinary program. Also, while
the suits by non-English speaking children assert that appropriate education
(for example, instruction in English) can mean using resources already devoted
to these children in a different manner, 33 at least some school district opposition to such suits is based on educators' assumptions that successful suits
34
will increase per pupil costs.'
Viewing broadly the matter of needy students, the question is where do
compensatory programs-those in which additional resources are provided-fit
in a voucher plan? One approach is to offer vouchers of different amounts
to children with certain characteristics. For example, children with some handicaps would have vouchers worth twice the value of ordinary vouchers, others
would have vouchers worth three times as much, and so on. One advantage
of this approach, if the amounts are sufficient, is that families with handicapped children would be able to choose whether to put the children in an
' This problem is considered in J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 64, at 70-76.
132 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. IlL. 1968), affd vnem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).

"I See Sugarman & Widess, supra note 117, at 177.

134

Id. at 177-78.
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integrated program (that is, with non-handicapped children but where some
supplemental services are provided to the exceptional child) or in a special
school (or class) exclusively for the handicapped. In this way the family, through
counseling, would be the arbiter of the on-going debate in the special education
field as to whether there should be integrated or self-contained classrooms
for such children.

135

As for the disadvantaged child, he or she also could be given a voucher worth
more than the voucher given to the average child, and this would give the school
he or she attends greater resources to devote to the child.13 6 The kinds of
compensatory programs offered would be determined by the market, influenced by the enrollment rules. In general, schools should respond to parental
wishes-some families might prefer that the extra resources be spent on their
disadvantaged child alone, while other families might prefer it to be spent on
the school as a whole. Concentrations of such children in certain schools would
bring in larger amounts of money-indeed, a further variation on the plan
would provide that a school with concentrations of disadvantaged children could
receive a financial bonus from the state. In a sense, an individual disadvantaged
child could choose between a school with extra funds (where there are others
like him) and another school which has less revenue but where he would attend classes with more advantaged classmates. It has been urged that extra
value vouchers be made available for the disadvantaged in order to make these
children more attractive prospects to schools; yet enrollment rules and the restrictions imposed on the spending of this additional money (either by the
market or by law) would substantially influence the impact of increased funds
on the desire of schools to admit disadvantaged children.
Important problems with allowing extra value vouchers for disadvantaged
children (and for handicapped or 'other such children) include: (1) selecting
what kinds of children are to qualify, (2) identifying the children who qualify,
and (3) deciding how much extra money is to be provided. Present programs
for disadvantaged and handicapped children have faced these problems with
rather unsatisfactory results. 137 Grave concerns about stigmatizing such children
have been raised. Perhaps a family could choose to avoid the stigma (and the
money) by deciding not to claim the extra value voucher for its child.
The discussion thus far has assumed that the voucher would cover all the
costs of a family's choice of schooling, that vouchers would be of the same value
(except in the case of special children as already described), and that user
families would not pay for vouchers other than through general taxation. Yet
voucher plans could include rules contrary to all of these assumptions and still
be workable.
The Friedman model suggests that schools be permitted to charge any
tuition they wish, not necessarily related to the voucher amount.1 3 This aspect
5

See Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education:Empirical Studies and Procedural
Proposals, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1974).
136 The Center for the Study of Public Policy proposed a "compensatory voucher" for disadvantaged
children. See note 18 supra.
..7 See Kirp, supra note 4.
138 Presumably they would not be able to charge less, collect the full voucher, and "kick back"
the difference in cash.
..
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of his plan is most criticized by liberal voucher proponents, but it is too simplistic
to complain that rich families will have more money spent on their children's
education than will the poor. Surely the rich would be able to supplement any
voucher plan by purchasing purely private education; no voucher advocate
proposes trying to stop this directly. And no one suggests that vouchers are
to be so large that they exhaust all further demand for education. Rather, it is
the side effects of allowing schools to charge tuition in excess of vouchers that
are of concern. Economic class isolation may result; richer families might choose
costlier schools in part to insure that their children do not attend schools with
poor families.
Such segregation does violence to more than the theory of inclusivity. Since
children themselves must be counted as part of a school's resources, tuition
add-on requirements could operate to bar poor children from the benefits
of association with richer children. It is also feared that higher cost schools will
use their financial advantage to obtain better teachers and disproportionately
better quality schooling than that available at lower tuition schools. This assumes
an imperfect market in the supply of educational inputs so that with extra
money the higher bidders can capture more than the amount of extra value
in services. If the number of distinctly good teachers is limited, this point has
merit. There is also a symbolic disadvantage if a publicly recognized association
develops between the best schools and rich and upper middle class children.
If the main virtue of allowing higher tuition schools is to satisfy different
tastes for education, this may be accomplished without putting the poor at
a disadvantage. Vouchers of varying values could be sold at a price which relates
to family income so that poor families would gain access to1 39the more costly
schools with the same relative financial effort as rich families.
The purchase of vouchers need not be confined to the implementation of
a scheme having vouchers of varying values; purchase could be required even
under a uniform voucher model. In other words, the voucher plan could provide
subsidies to poor families by the rich, but not to user families by non-users. At
some point, however, a policy of charging for education vouchers could run into
constitutional limitations. The Supreme Court intimated in Rodriguez that to
charge tuition for public schools might unconstitutionally discriminate against
the poor, if it had the effect of excluding them from a minimum or basic public
education. 140 Even if this were so, an "ability to pay" schedule should survive
judicial scrutiny, at least so long as the voucher was sufficient to purchase what
would be deemed a basic education program.
Another school finance issue raised by the prospect of a voucher plan is
'39 Professors John E. Coons, William H. Clune III, and I have dubbed this notion "family
power equalizing" and it is discussed in J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 125, at
256-68; J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 64; Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Recreating the Family's
Role in Education, in NEW MODELS FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION 216 (J. Guthrie & E. Wynne eds.
1971); Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 7 (1969).
140 411 U.S. at 25 n.60. In Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.
1971), vacated and remandedfor a determination of mootness, 409 U.S. 75 (1972), it was alleged that a
school textbook fee was unconstitutional if nonpayment resulted in denial of the books, since a
child whose fee was not paid would be effectively without education.
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whether the plan will increase efficiency and diminish pressure to increase
school spending. In reality it appears that political forces opposed to vouchers
(for example, public school personnel) may have to be "bribed" to accept even
an experiment; hence vouchers may have to carry a heavy price tag at the
41
outset.'
B. Related But Alternative Reforms
Obviously vouchers are not the only means available to attack inequities
in public education. Other reform efforts-some less drastic than vouchersmay also be considered. In addition, many reforms should be considered in
conjunction with vouchers.
1. Community Control
School governance must be carefully considered under any voucher plan.
It is fair to anticipate that a full-scale voucher experiment would tend either to
leave much of the governance issue to market mechanisms or insure that a
variety of governance arrangements were attempted, including those in which
families have little official voice in the ongoing policy decisions of the schools.
Hence, although under a voucher plan substantial power would be exercised
at the school site level, it might be wielded by one person. Thus, one should not
confuse decentralization of decision-making with consumer control; decentralization could also mean "principal" or "teaching staff' control.
Some have suggested that "voice" is more important to families than "choice"
and that political efforts aimed at insuring school choice actually drain pressure and support from more needed school governance reform. 142 This sort of
reform is generally labeled "community control.' 143 The specifics of community
control have taken various forms: election of school board members by neighborhood rather than at large, 4 4 division of school districts into subdistricts
with independent governance structures, 45 district and school level parent
advisory councils, 46 and so forth. These efforts seek to increase constituent
influence in what is seen to be an unresponsive, "professionally" run bureaucracy.
141This appears to have been the case in the Alum Rock Union School District. For a discussion
of this "voucher" plan, see Appendix infra.
142 1 am grateful to David Sonnenfeld, former research associate at the Childhood and Government Project, for compelling me to consider this issue. See Sonnenfeld, The Education Marketplace:
Toward a Theory of Family Choice in Schooling, May 1973 (Draft 2, on file with the author).
See generally A. HIRSCHMAN, ExIr,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).

VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FiRmuS,

143 See Kirp, Community Control, PublicPolicy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1355 (1970).
See also COMMUNITY CONTROL OF SCHOOLS (H. Levin ed. 1970); 15 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION (1973).
144But see Owens v. School Comm., 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969), where it was unsuc-

cessfully argued that at-large elections were unconstitutional.
45 This happened in New York City. See generally CONFRONTATION AT OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE (M. Berube & M. Gittell eds. 1964).
146 For an examination of the Los Angeles experience, compare Halverson, L.A. Decentralization

With Promise, 15 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 39 (1973), with Gurule & Ortega, L.A. Decentralization
With Problems, 15 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 43 (1973). Much of the push for parent advisory

councils has come in connection with federal Title I funds. See Yudof, Title I and Empowerment:
A Litigation Strategy, 5 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 11 (1970).
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As long as school districts rely substantially on local property taxes for their
financial support, the subdivision of city districts into wholly independent
subdistricts is undesirable since the subdistricts will typically have widely
differing fiscal capacities. Fiscal considerations aside, however, a major problem with community control is defining the community. This problem has a
rather straightforward answer under a voucher plan: the community is a voluntary one made up of those who choose to associate with the school; those who
dissent may exit. Communities are by choice. 147 When the community is a
geographic one, the answer becomes more difficult. It is very hard to know
what process should be employed in drawing a community's boundaries. The
ballot box seems ill-suited to this sort of decision-making. Frequently, existing
school attendance zones reflect considerations quite different from the notions
of commonality of interest which underlie community control proposals. Moreover, within a geographic area that has community controlled schools, some
families will surely disagree with school policies and programs and, unlike
the voucher plan situation, the only realistic remedy may be to move. Indeed,
as school variety increases, the intensity of displeasure felt by "trapped" dissenters may also increase. On the other hand, "neighborhood" decision-making
may have special advantages; residents who share common concerns besides
education may be able to create a strong web of ties and develop a system of
ordering priorities on a variety of issues.
This point emphasizes the differences between voucher plans and community control in the typical case. Community control contemplates the advancing of group interests (through representatives) whereas vouchers -emphasize individual family action. Community control advocates argue that community representatives better know what is desired by (or are more responsive
to) the people in their community than do far-away bureaucrats or board
members representing various groups. But perhaps individual families know
better what is best for themselves than do community leaders.
2. Within-School Choice
Most proposed voucher plans allow families to choose among a number of
schools, but a substantial portion of the current dissatisfaction with schools
probably stems from objections to a particular teacher or a particular program
with which the child has been associated. A system in which children would be
able to choose among third grade teachers, or choose to join any reading group
or education track offered, or choose curriculum offerings which they desired
rather than those required by the school or dictated to them by counselors,
may seem attractive to those who favor family choice. However, a public school
system may not be able to provide this kind of choice. It would probably be
undesirable and unworkable to require teachers at the elementary school level
to take all students who wished them as teachers. Moreover, in public school
buildings today, school classrooms are generally limited in the number of
students they can accommodate, although in newer buildings variable size
classes are available. Hence the problem of what to do about impossible "first
147 This idea is advanced in Coons, Book Review, 23 STAN. L. REv. 846 (1971).
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choices" develops again. Beyond this, because of the existing power of public
school teacher associations, public schools might not be able to respond adequately to within-school demand by eliminating teachers and courses that are
not chosen and adding programs that are wanted, rewarding personnel who
seemed especially popular, and bringing in new people who have desired
characteristics.
Of course, within-school choice is not guaranteed under voucher plans
either, and it remains to be seen whether the private sector would be any more
effective in responding to these demands. In any event, the orientation of
voucher proponents has not been toward voucher rules which would require
certain kinds of in-school choice to be made available by all providers; again,
there is an implicit reliance on the market to induce providers to offer the
kinds of choices that attract customers.
The flexibility of within-school choice might be accomplished through
changes in public school governance as well as through implementation of a
voucher plan. Indeed, community controlled schools which have as an objective
the maximization of within-school choice by students provide a very attractive
alternative to the voucher approach.
CONCLUSION

Today we hear more and more about children's rights (or "kid lib"). Since
one argument for the voucher plan is that it allows children to have increased
voice in their schooling, it may provide a test of what children's rights can mean,
particularly for younger children. Perhaps we shall come to believe that
children's rights is an empty phrase for all but de facto emancipated youth.
In that event, we are still left with the question of who best speaks for the child.
From this perspective, vouchers result in more voice for parents. Few would
deny that the state must, at a minimum, play a residual role in extreme cases.
Rather the question presented by voucher proposals is whether our children
and our society are better off with the current level of state intervention in
the provision of education.
Experimental voucher plans offer an opportunity t6 determine whether
substantial unsatisfied parental and student demand exists for various kinds
of educational programs. At the same time, experimentation can show whether
any full-scale voucher scheme is politically feasible. Some limited, federally
promoted voucher experiments are now underway or being planned. These
experiments are described in the Appendix to this article. However, these
federally promoted experiments, while a hopeful sign for those who wish to
see experimentation in increasing the family's role in education, are an
insufficient exploration of the voucher concept. A large variety of other demonstration programs are needed before informed decisions can be made regarding
the optimal quantum of family choice.
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Appendix
VOUCHER EXPERIMENTS

A. California
148
1. The Alum Rock Voucher Plan: The Public Schools

The theories in regard to the use of vouchers are already being tested
through a "voucher" experiment now underway in the Alum Rock Union
School District in Northern California. The district receives substantial financial and planning support from the federal government, which initiated
the experiment. 149 The Alum Rock plan was implemented in the fall of 1972
and an upcoming large-scale evaluation of the experiment has been funded
by OEO. The discussion in this Appendix will not anticipate the evaluation,
but will concern itself with some of the policy decisions made in Alum Rock
as they relate to the issues raised in the article.
Although Alum Rock's contract with OEO contemplated that private
schools would be included, as of this writing the plan's operation has been
restricted to the district's public schools. The Alum Rock district offers education through the eighth grade (including kindergarten); its approximately
15,000 pupils attend 19 elementary and 6 middle schools. In the first year of
the voucher plan (1972-73), 3,900 pupils attending 6 schools (5 elementary
and 1 middle school) participated; in the second year, the number of participating students increased to 9,000 and the number of schools to 13 (3 middle
and 10 elementary schools). Although an additional school or two may be
added for the 1974-75 year, it is not currently contemplated that the entire
district will participate in the voucher plan.
In order to increase the choices available to families, each school was required to offer at least two distinct programs. By the end of the first year there
were 22 such mini-schools available within the 6 participating public school
buildings. The 13 schools participating in the 1973-74 year offered more than
40 mini-schools. In principle, the mini-schools are to operate autonomous
148The bulk of this section on the Alum Rock experiment is taken from Levin, Alum Rock:
Vouchers Pay Off, 15 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 57 (1973); National Institute of Education, Vouchers:
The Experience at Alum Rock, Dec. 1973 (on file with the author); Alum Rock Union School
District, Transition Model Voucher Proposal, Apr. 12, 1972, for the Office of Economic Opportunity, which sets out many of the policies goVerning the plan; Alum Rock "fact sheets" and documents provided to parents and on file with the author; many candid and helpful conversations
with Dr. Joel Levin, Director of Alum Rock's Voucher Project; and the author's personal experience
as a consultant for the Center for the Study of Public Policy with respect to the inclusion of private schools in the Alum Rock plan.
149 The Office of Economic Opportunity financed a study of vouchers in 1968 and in 1970
by the Center for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) in Cambridge, Massachusetts; the study group
recommended federally supported experiments to test at least one type of voucher scheme. This
study led to the publication of EDUCATION VOUCHERS, supra note 18. OEO then made grants to a
number of school districts to undertake feasibility studies, and when Alum Rock agreed to try out
a program patterned after the recommendations of the CSPP, OEO agreed to provide assistance
for what is expected to be a five-to-seven year period. With the establishment of the National
Institute of Education (NIE) and the reorganization of OEO, responsibility for the voucher
project was shifted from OEO to NIE in July, 1973.
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programs, but in practice there are a variety of sharing arrangements within
schools relating to the library, physical education, and other facilities. Also,
each building continues to have one principal in charge of all the programs
offered.

Extensive efforts were made to inform participating families about the
alternatives available. In the spring of 1973, each family was sent brochures
including a description of the voucher plan, the enrollment rules, and onepage descriptions of each of the mini-school programs. These descriptions
were in large part prepared by the mini-schools themselves, and emphasized
a variety of things-for example, some schools named their teachers, apparently
hoping to appeal to those families that would choose on the basis of personal
reputations. Parents were also invited to ask for copies of evaluation reports
of each program that had operated in the first year, to visit any mini-school,
and to talk with parent counselors, part-time paraprofessionals who provide
information to parents making school choice decisions.
The enrollment rules at Alum Rock are changing. For attendance during the
1973-74 year, every family that made its selection by May 25, 1973, was guaranteed its first choice of mini-schools. Families were not, however, guaranteed
their first choice of physical location; if a particular mini-school was demanded
by more students than the mini-school could accommodate in its present facilities, then the mini-school's program would be expanded by using portables
or satellite locations in other school buildings with extra space as a result of
either decreased demand or the general decline in elementary school enrollment. 150 There have been reports that undersubscribed schools did not comfortably accommodate the satellites of popular schools in their buildings. For
1973-74, a "squatters' rights" rule prevailed so that students who attended a
school building in the prior year (and their younger siblings) would be given
preference over other students if they wanted to remain in that building.
Children living more than walking distance from their voucher schools are
provided transportation financed out of the central district budget rather
than the budgets of the individual schools.
For the school year 1974-75, the first choice guarantee, the satellite location, and the squatters' rights rules have been abolished. Instead, at the building
level a first come-first served rule is being used, and families began to sign up
in the spring of 1974. A child may choose to attend any mini-school within
the host school building until that building's capacity is filled. Hence, within the
building, spaces will be allocated to those mini-schools that building occupants
prefer. This shift seems to increase the possibility of greater competition within
schools but less competition among schools; the impact on family choice will
probably be mixed. Some families that might have obtained their first choice
in the past by demanding very popular mini-schools before the deadline will
lose out; families that apply during the summer, on the other hand, will probably be able to gain access to mini-schools of their first choice. Perhaps the
150Like many school districts around the country, Alum Rock is now experiencing an enrollment decline as a result of falling birth rates. However, transfers of children from non-voucher
to voucher schools thus far seem to have prevented the voucher schools from having as much
"excess capacity" as had been anticipated.
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first come-first served rule will turn out to be roughly equivalent to the squatters'
rights rule with a lottery for remaining places.
Thus far, when underdemanded programs find themselves with too many
teachers, those excess teachers are given priority access to available positions
in high-demand programs, provided that they are acceptable to the receiving
program. Hence, students who seek to move away from unpopular teachers
might find these teachers trailing along behind them to their new school or
program. There has been too little experience yet to tell whether this may
become a real problem. The presumption underlying this rule is that existing
certificated teaching personnel will be able to adapt to what is demanded by
families and students. Perhaps this presumption is unwarranted. The teachermovement rule, however, does not presume that all teachers will be placed in
other schools when demand for their mini-school declines. Indeed, if a teacher
cannot be placed in another mini-school or in an Alum Rock school not in the
voucher program or in the central office of the district, then the National
Institute of Education (NIE) will pay his salary for at least a year. So far, all
teachers have been placed somewhere in the district.
There are no formal rules for determining which teachers are to be selected
to leave an underdemanded mini-school, although it would not be surprising
if this risk falls most heavily on those with least seniority. The informal process
of reallocating teachers first seeks volunteers and then turns to decisions either
by teachers as a group or by.the building principal. The families that continue to
support the mini-school appear to be excluded from this decision process.
The criteria which govern whether a teacher who is freed by an underdemanded
school will be taken on by a mini-school with a vacant teacher position are
also unclear. Schools with vacancies can voluntarily hire individual available
teachers. As a practical matter, school principals may find themselves taking
on some teachers that neither they nor any mini-school within their building
wants. Already, there have been a number of teacher shifts under the voucher
plan, including some moves from voucher schools to non-voucher schools in
15 1
the district.
In the first year, less than 5 per cent of the 3,900 participating children
were enrolled in schools other than those to which they would have been assigned had there been no voucher plan. In the second year, however, about 15
per cent of the students chose schools other than the ones to which they would
have otherwise been assigned. Interestingly, in the second year-there was more
movement away from neighborhood schools by those who had just entered
the program than by those who had been in participating schools during the
first year. Perliaps this was because some mini-schools had already established
strong reputations and could attract new recruits. More than 60 per cent of
families each year chose mini-schools which label themselves as nontraditional.
1 Since these teachers are probably least pleased with the operation of the voucher plan
and .report their feelings to colleagues, it is not surprising that district-wide teacher *opinion about
the plan 'seems markedly more favorable within the voucher schools. Also, because the schools
in the plan volunteered, their teachers were probably substantially more favorable to the plan
at the outset. Preliminary analysis also suggests that non-voucher school teachers have higher
salaries, suggesting perhaps that innovation is favored more by younger faculty.
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Also, substantial numbers of families with more than one child (reportedly about
40 per cent in 1972-73-although this number may be suspect) placed their
children in two or more mini-schools. These figures suggest that the opportunity to choose has appealed to families. It is unclear whether most of the
change is prompted by a deep dissatisfaction with traditional education or by
curiosity about innovation. Surveys indicate that families usually give the latter
reason for the change.
Thus far, family choices have not fostered racial isolation, either among
school buildings or among mini-schools, with the possible exception of those
programs that are designed to appeal to specific minority groups, such as
bilingual-bicultural programs. On the other hand, neither has the plan significantly increased racial balance. While the schools participating in the first
year were largely racially balanced to start with, this was not as true of the
schools added in the second year.
To date the mini-schools are essentially teacher-initiated, although there
was some surveying of family opinion at the outset. However, those teachers
who are the leaders in most mini-schools are probably becoming better at market
research and hence more attentive to the interests of their constituent families. Each school building is required to have a parent advisory committee;
each separate mini-school has voluntarily established its own parent advisory
committee. More time will be needed for the roles of these committees to evolve.
The role played by school principals in initiating mini-schools-such as having
a veto-is somewhat ambiguous. Clearly the principal must be concerned
with the allocation of space within his building and, at least in the past two
years, about losing some of his building space to more popular programs from
other schools. A working rule of thumb, at least at the elementary school level,
has developed to the effect that mini-schools are allocated one classroom for
every 30 students they attract. No mini-school has yet folded, even thoigh some
have suffered a drop in enrollment between the first and second year.
The Alum Rock district's educational program continues to be subject to
all of the provisions of the California Education Code relating to curriculum,
and it is unclear whether this has inhibited program variety. A request to
provide relief from statutory class size limits was rejected by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
The allocation of voucher funds in Alum Rock is different from that envisioned in most voucher plans previously described. In the first place, all
mini-schools are required to use approximately $300 per pupil of their voucher
to buy services from the central district and to support district-wide operations.
There is some flexibility with respect to the centrally provided services relating
to nursing and psychological counseling-a school may reject them and use
the money for something else or accept and pay for them-but these account
for a rather small portion of the central services allocation. More importantly,
a mini-school is charged for the teachers it employs at the average teacher
salary cost within the district rather than at the actual cost of the specific person
employed. Hence thdre is no way for a mini-school to substitute lower-salary
teachers for higher-salary ones, even if it believed that this would be a good
way to allocate its money. And, although schools have begun to be allowed to
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substitute non-teacher resources for teachers, class size restrictions put a tight
ceiling on the degree of substitution schools can introduce. Hence, since the
normal budget of a school, after deducting central services and teacher costs,
is really rather small, in reality there is little budget flexibility at the mini-school
level except for funds provided by NIE.
As part of the experiment, NIE has funded a "compensatory voucher"
of more than $200 per pupil (about $275 in 1973-74) which is provided to a
mini-school for each of its enrollees who is eligible for a free lunch under the
federal lunch program. Since more than half of Alum Rock's pupils are eligible,
much of the innovations introduced will be financed by these additional funds.
While the Center for the Study of Public Policy proposal to OEO contemplated
that compensatory vouchers would be provided for disadvantaged children,
it seems highly unlikely that the federal government would underwrite the
costs of such vouchers on a large-scale, long-term basis unless Title I funds
are converted for use in voucher programs as "compensating vouchers." Without state aid or federal aid, a compensatory vouchers policy would require
a reallocation of present district funds. It is extremely doubtful that Alum
Rock would have agreed to participate in the voucher program had it been
required to produce the compensatory vouchers from its own funds, especially
since Alum Rock is a property-poor district which spends a modest amount
per pupil. In sum, it is unlikely that districts like Alum Rock, in the absence
of additional funds, will adopt the compensatory voucher approach.
2. Private Schools and S.B. 600
For the first year of the voucher program, the Alum Rock school district
took the position that participation of private schools was not legally permissible.
The district's concerns were that it did not have statutory authority to contract
with a private school to provide education pursuant to the voucher program
rules, and that providing voucher funds to private schools was prohibited
by the California constitution. The district now believes that these obstacles
have been eliminated by Senate Bill 600 which was enacted in the late summer
of 1973 and took effect in January, 1974.152 However, S.B. 600 limits the
manner in which private schools can participate and is plagued by difficult
questions of statutory interpretation.
There appears to be wide agreement that California's Education Code
is restrictive: local school district authorities do not have the power to do anything that is not explicitly or implicitly delegated to them by the Education
Code. In November, 1972, California voters passed Proposition 5, now part
of article IX, section 14, of the state constitution, which provides that
the legislature may enact provisions reversing the presumption. 53 Following
such legislative action, school districts would be permitted to carry out any
152 Demonstration Scholarship Act of 1973, ch. 1159, [1973] Cal. Stats., CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 31175-31198.2 (West Supp. 1974).
153 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 14. This section provides in part: "The Legislature may authorize
the governing boards of all school districts to initiate and carry on any programs, activities, or to
otherwise act in any manner which is not in conflict with the laws and purposes for which school
districts are established."
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educational activity unless it were expressly prohibited by the Education Code.
There have been some serious questions raised as to whether, in those areas
in which the Code is quite specific, prohibitions will be implied through the
notion of preemption, but they have not yet been resolved because no legisla'tion implementing Proposition 5 has passed.15 4 Hence, most districts would be
reluctant to undertake any unusual educational activity unless they were confident that their power to do so was already implied in the Code.15 5
A furither problem is presented in section 8 of article IX of the California
constitution, which provides, inter alia, that "[nlo public money shall ever be
appropriated for the support of... any school not under the exclusive control
of the officers of the public schools. . .. ,"156 While the Alum Rock feasibility
study was in progress, the forerunner of S.B. 600, then A.B. 150, was introduced
in the California legislature. A.B. 150 would have enabled districts to participate
in voucher plans of the type now going on in Alum Rock and would have permitted such districts to include private schools in the plan. But in addition to
political hurdles, a legislative counsel opinion cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of A.B. 150 in the absence of clear provisions that participating
private schools would be "exclusively controlled" by public officials. 1 7 This
opinion is not easy to reconcile with existing state programs providing vouchers
to handicapped children and scholarships to high school graduates to be used
at private colleges and universities which clearly do not meet the "exclusive
contror' test.' 1 Nevertheless, when A.B. 150 was reintroduced in 1973 as
S.B. 600, changes were made in order to respond to the earlier legislative
counsel opinion. S.B. 600 simply stipulates that all participating schools must
be under the "exclusive control" of public school officials, and then it defines
the powers a school district must have over participating private schools.
For example, A.B. 27, which would have implemented proposition 5, failed to pass in 1973.
Since school districts already acquire by contract educational services from so-called "educational technology corporations" (these corporations supply personnel as well as materials) and the
services of experts of one sort or another (including accountants and management consultants),
it might be argued that sufficient precedent exists for the acquisition of an entire mini-school
program by contract. A major difficulty wit this analysis, however, is that pursuant to section
13251, school districts are required to employ certificated persons for positions requiring certification (primarily teachers), and pursuant to section 13581, school districts are required to employ
classified and nonclassified personnel for other positions. These two sections of the Code suggest
that the personnel carrying out the education function in the school district are to be employees
of the district rather than employees of a contractor. Indeed, this was precisely the opinion of the
California District Court of Appeals in California School Employees Ass'n v. Willits Unified School
Dist., 243 Cal. App. 2d 776, 52 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1966), which held that a school district could not
engage janitorial personnel by contract, since section 13581 contemplated that such positions
would be filled by employees. While that decision could also be used to attack the hiring of firms
which provide educational specialists, perhaps the latter can be justified under the district's power
pursuant to section 1971(a) to carry on "research" since specialist firms typically provide either
peripheral services, training services, or experimental programs which do not constitute the core
of the school activity.
156 In addition, section 24 of article XIII of the California constitution prohibits the use of public
funds in aid of schools "controlled by any religious creed, church, or sectarian denomination...."
Is' Letter to Hon. Leo J. Ryan, Educational Voucher Project-# 9965, May 6, 1970.
151The special education vouchers are authorized by section 6871 and section 6770 of the
Education Code (although only the former is used in practice), and scholarships for college study
are authorized by sections 31201-31251. Legislative counsel distinguished these programs as limited
in contrast to the voucher plan which would be available to any student (in the participating area).
The opinion also noted that the constitutionality of the other programs had not been tested.
154
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Legislative counsel this time concurred as to the bill's constitutionality on this
point, at least if the powers given to public officials with respect to participating
private schools were actually exercised. 1 59 These powers include:
(1) The power to promulgate general rules and regulations regarding to [sic]
use of demonstration scholarships [vouchers].
(2) The power to establish the amount of the scholarship.
(3) The power to prescribe rules and regulations which are binding upon
participating schools.
(4) The power to establish standards for teachers, instructors, and textbooks.
(5) The power to review and approve the suspension or expulsion of a pupil of
a participating school.
(6) The power to make any appropriate use of participating school facilities,
equipment, and supplies. 160
S.B. 600, as passed, provides that four districts may participate in
voucher experiments. This does not suggest that Alum Rock was acting
illegally prior to the passage of S.B. 600, nor that Alum Rock's present
plan may not be replicated by more than four California districts, but
rather that the extra advantages of the law are to be available in only
four experimental settings. These advantages include allowing private
schools to participate 1 6 1 and allowing the Superintendent of Public Instruction to waive nearly every provision of the Education Code. 62 In
order to qualify as a participating district under S.B. 600, teachers must
play significant roles in the formation and operation of the public sector
voucher schools.' 63 In addition, all provisions of the experiment, including
the participation of private schools, are subject to discussion (read "collective
bargaining") with public school teachers' associations. 6 4 These benefits
and safeguards for public school teachers probably explain the support
the bill received from the California Teachers Association.
In general, the bill parallels the Alum Rock plan; private schools, if
they participate, must accept students under the same rules as public
schools 165 and may not charge tuition greater then the amount of the
1'9
Letter to Hon. John L. Harmer, Demonstration Scholarships (S.B. 600-# 11788), Aug. 23,
1973.

§ 31196(c) (West Supp. 1974).
S.B. 600, art. 4, CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 31194, 31196 (West Supp. 1974).
162 CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 31186, 31187 (West Supp. 1974). The Superintendent may iot waive
provisions of S.B. 600 itself, so that legislative conditions on the operation of the voucher plan
must be obeyed.
163 CAL EDUC. CODE § 31185.1 (West Supp. 1974).
164 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 31181.5 (West Supp. 1974).
16 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 3 1185(b) (West Supp. 1974). Actually, S.B. 600 provides for admissions
rules which may be seen to be at odds with those which Alum Rock has used to date, since it contemplates that at least fifty per cent of a school's capacity will be filled by a lottery if there is excess
demand for those positions. (This is the rule advanced in the original CSPP proposal.) The law
does not deal, however, with the question of when determination as to whether there are excess
applicants is to be made. Given the experience in Alum Rock, it is readily apparent that several
interpretations are possible. Hence it is unclear whether Alum Rock's enrollment rules, old or new,
comply. It should be noted further that section 31185(b) specifically provides that schools may not
discriminate against students or teachers on the basis of "race, religion, color, national origin,
economic status, political affiliation, or sex"; that "students from disadvantaged racial or bilingual
minority groups be admitted in proportion as such students make application"; and that schools
must take "an affirmative position to secure a racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically integrated
160 CAL. EDUC. CODE
161
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voucher. 66 Unfortunately, it is unclear whether under S.B 600 participating
private schools remain "pri'ate" or, through "exclusive control," actually
become "public" schools. This is an important distinction in at least two
respects. For example, the bill provides that participating private schools
are to be subject to all of the provisions of "this code" (meaning the California Education Code).' 6 7 Does this mean that the provision is applicable
to private or to public schools? It is difficult to justify the inclusion of
this language if it refers to private school provisions as they already
applied. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the drafters would want
to force all private schools either to have certificated and classified positions
for their employees or to fill jobs with properly credentialed persons as do
public schools. Although under the bill the Superintendent of Public Instruction can waive code provisions, the interpretation of this issue will
determine which provisions must be taken up with him.
On the other hand, if the participating private schools are still seen as
private schools, the district may forfeit state aid funds with respect
to pupils who attend them. This would require that the vouchers of private school attendees be funded solely from local property taxes and
federal funds. Such a ruling would create a considerable disincentive to
include private schools in the plan.
The reasons for the fear of funding cut-offs are dual: section 6 of
article IX of the constitution provides that the entire state school fund shall be
appropriated for the support of the public schools, and section 11251 of the
Code provides that a district's average daily attendance (ADA), which determines how much state aid it receives, is based upon the number of its pupils
who are under the immediate supervision and control of certificated employees
of the district. It may be argued that this statutory provision was implicitly
modified by S.B. 600, and presumably the Superintendent of Public Instruction could waive section 11251. But the constitutional roadblock is not so easily
escaped. Again, there is a precedent since vouchers for handicapped children
are allocated in the face of the same provision and these children still generate
state school aid funds for their local district.' 68 If districts proceed under the
S.B. 600 program and include private schools, they will do so notwithstanding
the constitutional provision on the assumption that the Superintendent of
Public Instruction will construe the provision as not restrictive. Clearly, the
drafters of S.B. 600 hoped to encourage voucher programs that would include
private schools.
An interesting aspect of the Alum Rock experience thus far is the lack
of local interest in including private school options. If nothing else, this
has meant a lack of pressure on the district to cut through the adminisstudent body which shall, to the greatest possible extent, reflect the racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
composition" of the students participating in the voucher program. It might be argued that some
schools in Alum Rock are violating the provisos as to "proportionality" and "affirmative action"
(for example, those schools appealing to ethnic minorities).
166 CAL. EDUC. CODE

§ 31185(c) (West Supp. 1974).

§ 31194 (West Supp. 1974).
166 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6873 (West 1969).
167 CAL. EDUC. CODE
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trative, legal, and other barriers to their inclusion. Putting aside religious
schools, the Alum Rock mini-schools may be providing most of the possible
options in terms of personnel and programs that Alum Rock families
16 9
desire.
B. Other Education Voucher Plans
In addition to the Alum Rock experiment, federally sponsored voucher
experiments may be in operation by September, 1974, in the state of New
Hampshire and in East Hartford, Connecticut.
1. New Hampshire170
The New Hampshire proposal would include private schools on
terms consistent with the Friedman voucher idea. Private schools would be
able to charge tuition in excess of the voucher amount. While they can admit both voucher and non-voucher students, the tuition charge must be the
same for all students. Private schools would also control their own admissions, so long as they gave assurances that they would comply with
Tite VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,171 which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin.
Nonsectarian private schools would be regulated and could participate
if they met the standards now required of private schools. Furthermore,
nonsectarian private schools could only join the plan in the second year
of operation, so that at the outset the New Hampshire plan would be
1'69This conclusion may not be wholly correct in view of the difficulties faced by the one private

school in Alum Rock that has sought inclusion in the voucher program. Greater Resources
Organized With Kids, Inc. (variously called GRO With Kids, GROW Kids, and GRO) has
presented a plan to the district which offers an alternative educational experience for fourth
through eighth graders, relying heavily on (I) community physical resources (students would spend
much time outside the school building learning about the community and using public facilities),
(2) community human resources (artisans, professionals, and other persons with specific skills,
who are not traditionally-trained teachers, would provide substantial but part time instruction),
and (3) student initiative (students would have a substantial voice in the governance of the school,
the choice of their learning activities, and school budget deliberations). See GRO Proposal to Alum
Rock Union School District, June 1973 (on file with the author). In short, GRO proposed a combination of free school techniques that have been written about or actually introduced in various
places throughout the country. Like the district's mini-schools, GRO is teacher-initiated (although
not by Alum Rock teachers) rather than family-initiated or community organization-initiated.
Although the Alum Rock Board of Education made a series of planning grants to GRO and
finally approved entering into a contract with GRO which would bring its school into the district's
voucher plan, the contract remains unsigned as of this writing, so it is unclear whether the GRO
school will be part of the district's offering in the fall of 1974. During the year spent negotiating
with the Alum Rock district, GRO has had great difficulty maintaining support among the district
families that would provide it with a core of students. These students are naturally impatient and
concerned about their status at their present schools. This experience suggests that unless some
clear and quick procedures are developed for including private schools, any school such as GRO
which does not have an ongoing independent financial base to carry it through a prolonged
negotiation period will find it terribly difficult to get underway. And, because most communityinitiated
schools would be newly organized, they would probably lack outside financial support.
0
17 See New Hampshire Educational Voucher Project Feasibility Study, approved by State Board
of Education, Aug. 14, 1973, and draft of revised version (on file with the author), obtained
from Mr. John Mende, Dartmouth College, member of the Economic and Budget Education
Voucher Sub-Committee established by the New Hampshire Board of Education.
171 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
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limited to public schools. Private sectarian schools would not be permitted
to participate in the New Hampshire plan unless their exclusion is determined to be unconstitutional, presumably as a violation of the equal protection or free exercise clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Only selected public school districts in New Hampshire would
participate in the plan. However, the vouchers would be valid across district lines, and redeemable in schools in both other participating and nonparticipating districts. However, out-of-district receiving public schools
would have discretion whether or not to accept applicants. Moreover, if
the tuition in the receiving district (the charge made for nonresident students)
is greater than a student's voucher, the family must make up the additional
payment; hence, unless receiving districts award scholarships, this may
present a serious roadblock to poor families.
17 2

2. East Hartford, Connecticut

In contrast, the East Hartford proposal is modeled after the recommendations of the Center for the Study of Public Policy. 1 3 Its primary
orientation is toward opening up all of the East Hartford public schools
to the families of the district. Places in schools which were overdemanded
would be distributed by lottery. There would be "squatters' rights" for those
families whose children wished to remain in their pre-voucher plan neighborhood schools.
The East Hartford proposal contemplates that steps would be taken to
include private schools pursuant to Connecticut's Public Act No. 122; 174
this statute, based on a model enabling act prepared by the Center for the
Study of Public Policy, is similar to California's S.B. 600. However, unlike S.B. 600, aside from prohibiting private schools from discriminating
on the basis of race, national origin, color, or economic status, Public
Act No. 122 does not dictate private school admission rules, nor does it call
for "exclusive control" by public authorities. It is not yet known to what
extent the actual plan would restrict private schools, which are prohibited
from charging tuition in excess of the voucher amount.
3. HandicappedChildren
Many states already have "voucher" plans for certain handicapped
children. California's program is not atypical. If no suitable public education program is available in the district, the family of a handicapped
child may be given a voucher worth up to the amount of money that would
172 See Extending East Hartford Parents' Choice of Schools (on file with the author). This
proposal resulted in an NIE feasibility study grant to East Hartford. The proposal reports tentative voucher rules adopted and tabled by the East Hartford Board of Education on December
13, 173
1973.
See note 18 supra.
14 The Connecticut law is designed to permit religious schools to participate, but is drafted in
a manner which would permit that provision to be severed, if found unconstitutional, leaving the
remainder of the bill intact. East Hartford has some Catholic schools (and some former Catholic
schools which have now closed), no non-religious private schools (at least with substantial enrollment), and its population is nearly all white.
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otherwise have been spent on the child by the district. The voucher is
then used to pay tuition at a private school chosen by the family. 17 5 Access to the voucher is by no means a matter of right and, absent litigation,
if the child's district or another reasonably accessible district has a program
which purports to deal with the child's special needs, the child's district
1 76
can, if it wishes, successfully resist having to provide the voucher.
Since the voucher a child receives is based on the amount his district
spends on each child with his particular handicap, voucher amounts
vary from district to district. This is different from the New York special
education voucher plan, for example, where a statewide amount is determined-up to $2,000 per child.17 7 Tuition may be charged in excess of the
voucher in both states. In California, private schools which accept special
education vouchers must meet certain standards not required of schools
that do not accept vouchers, but these
requirements do not appear to re17
strict unduly the school's autonomy.
Unfortunately, little is known about how the special education voucher
program actually works. The program is not large; in January, 1974, approximately 2,000 vouchers had been issued for the 1973-74 year in the
entire state of California, 7 9 compared with perhaps 112,000 children enrolled in public school special education programs. 80 Of course many
families resort to private schools without the benefit of vouchers. It has
been speculated that private schools engage in price discrimination; parents
have been advised that when tuition is being discussed, they should not
reveal to the private school that they have a voucher. For children with
serious or multiple handicaps there simply may be not adequate private
schools purchasable for the amount of the voucher. Moreover, little is
known about the racial or socioeconomic characteristics of the participating private schools. In any event, despite the small scale and special
nature of the schooling involved, a study of these special education
voucher plans in a number of states would be worthwhile.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6871 (West 1969).
176 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6871.5 (West 1969).
177 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 4407 (McKinney 1969).
178 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6874.5 (West 1969);
17
175

5 Cal. Adm. Code 3122-3123.

See letter from Jacque T. Ross, Chief, Bureau of School Apportionments and Reports, to
County Superintendents of Schools and County Auditors, Jan. 22, 1974 (on file with the author).
180 The 112,000 is comprised of about 12,000 trainable mentally retarded children, about 34,000
educationally mentally retarded children, about 65,000 educationally handicapped children, and
about 1,000 multiple-handicapped children. These handicaps are the sort which are covered by
the voucher plan. There are also a great number of children in other public school special education
programs: about 6,000 deaf or severely hard-of-hearing, about 3,000 blind or partially sighted,
about 10,000 with orthopedic problems, about 2,000 aphasic, about 3,000 pregnant girls, about
2,000 very low functioning in development centers, about 45,000 in remedial physical education,
about 115,000 in speech therapy, and about 150,000 in programs for the mentally gifted. These
are 1972-73 figures provided by Dave Dietrich of the California Department of Education (Statistics) to Ellen G. Widess of the Childhood and Government Project.

